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ABSTRACT 
  Although price-fixing agreements remain per se illegal in the United 
States, courts have undermined the per se rule against price fixing by 
making it harder for plaintiffs to prove that such an agreement 
exists. For example, most courts that have considered the issue have 
held that defendants’ price-fixing conduct in a foreign market is not 
probative of price fixing in the United States. This Article examines the 
relationship between foreign and domestic price-fixing activity and 
shows how expanding a price-fixing cartel from foreign markets into 
the United States benefits the cartel by reducing the risk of arbitrage, 
stabilizing the cartel, and concealing the conspiracy from global 
antitrust authorities. The Article then takes the insights from the 
empirical and theoretical cartel literature and applies them to antitrust 
doctrine in order to demonstrate why defendants’ overseas price-fixing 
arrangements are relevant to proving the existence of an agreement in 
litigation claiming that the same defendants fixed prices in the 
American market. Finally, the Article encourages courts to better 
understand how international price-fixing cartels operate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For most of the first half of the twentieth century, price-fixing 
cartels controlled international trade in important commodities, from 
steel and aluminum to coffee and sugar. European countries did not 
have antitrust laws and European governments largely supported the 
efforts of their national companies to participate in international 
cartels. These cartels, after all, generated large profits for their nations’ 
firms and transferred enormous wealth from consumers abroad to 
producers at home. Because the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 
condemned price fixing, American firms could not legally join these 
international cartels. 
Yet international cartels insinuated themselves into the American 
marketplace, often with the involvement of U.S. firms. Despite the risk 
of antitrust liability, many American firms participated in international 
cartels during the interwar period.1 During this era, American firms 
played important roles in European-based international cartels in 
several ways: illegally, directly or through European parent companies; 
through export cartels; and “informally, through an ‘understanding’ 
 
 1. GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRON W. WATKINS, CARTELS OR COMPETITION?: THE 
ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS BY BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT 135 (1948) 
(“Under American public policy the legal risks of cartel engagements are formidable, yet 
American companies have become associated with international cartel ventures directly or 
indirectly in a large number of industries.”). 
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with a formal cartel.”2 The Sherman Act made it harder to bring 
American firms into the fold, but many international cartels, such as 
the international steel cartel, persevered and convinced their 
American counterparts to join them.3 European companies with U.S. 
subsidiaries often instructed their American divisions to follow the 
cartel policies of their European-based parents.4 Even when cartel 
managers initially excluded the American market from their cartel 
agreements, as did the international nitrogen cartel, the cartel 
arrangements soon expanded to include the United States.5 
In addition to conspiring in unambiguously illegal cartel activity, 
American firms sometimes participated in international cartels 
through so-called export cartels. Under the Webb-Pomerene Act, 
American firms could legally create export cartels, which (subject to 
registration and certain conditions) allowed American firms to fix 
prices for exports, but not in the domestic market.6 Though contrary to 
the purpose of the Webb-Pomerene Act, these export cartels 
sometimes participated in larger international cartels and reduced 
competition in the American market.7 For example, in the sulphur 
industry, “[o]nce [the American firms] had joined hands to exploit 
foreign markets, effective price competition at home disappeared.”8 
 
 2. Valerie Y. Suslow, Cartel Contract Duration: Empirical Evidence from Inter-War 
International Cartels, 14 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 705, 708 (2005).  
 3. CLEMENS WURM, BUSINESS, POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: STEEL, 
COTTON AND INTERNATIONAL CARTELS IN BRITISH POLITICS, 1924–1939, at 164 (Patrick 
Salmon trans., 1993); see id. at 184 (“The countries which belonged to the international steel cartel 
controlled around 80 per cent of world steel exports after Britain’s inclusion, and around 90 per 
cent after the agreement with the United States.”). 
 Even when American producers are not involved in a particular market, the Sherman 
Act plays a role in how international cartels interact with the American market. American 
antitrust law deterred the international diamond cartel from operating out of New York, but did 
not dissuade the cartel from targeting American consumers. ERVIN HEXNER, INTERNATIONAL 
CARTELS 253 (1946). 
 4. HEXNER, supra note 3, at 312–13 (discussing hormone cartel).  
 5. Id. at 329 (discussing nitrogen cartel).  
 6. STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 1, at 435 (“One of the greatest risks the United States 
incurs from the Webb-Pomerene law is the spread of monopolistic practices from export trade to 
the domestic economy. Practices that are lawful under this Act when used in export business are 
illegal in domestic business.”).  
 7. Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 662–64 (2004); 
see also Andrew R. Dick, Identifying Contracts, Combinations and Conspiracies in Restraint of 
Trade, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 203, 210 (1996) (“It is possible also that firms might 
have used legal Webb-Pomerene agreements to help enforce illegal collusion domestically. . . . 
[D]uring most of the Act’s history, the FTC and the courts failed to scrutinize possible spillovers 
between export cartelization and the domestic market.”). 
 8. STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 1, at 261. 
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Many American firms treated their Webb-Pomerene status as 
permission to participate with foreign firms in an international cartel.9 
Finally, many American firms had informal relationships with 
international cartels, which enabled the U.S. firms to partake in the 
cartel’s activities without actually belonging to the cartel, and 
consequently brought the U.S. market within the control of the cartel’s 
decisionmakers. For example, American plate glass producers used 
licensing and marketing agreements to coordinate with members of the 
European-based plate glass cartel.10 In some major industries, such as 
potash, when European cartels reduced worldwide output, it led to 
American firms developing their own U.S.-based production; yet the 
American firms often eventually followed the cartel’s policies.11 In 
many commodity markets, American firms with European subsidiaries 
often worked with price-fixing cartels in European countries in which 
cartel activity was legal.12 This cartel participation in foreign markets 
facilitated price fixing in the American market.13 Even when it seemed 
that the United States was not included in an international cartel, some 
American firms found ways to participate in international cartels while 
not technically belonging to them; for example, the Aluminum 
Company of America (Alcoa) participated in the international 
aluminum cartel through its Canadian subsidiary.14 
Through all of these various mechanisms, international cartels 
engulfed the American marketplace and colluded to fix prices in the 
United States. During this era, the Department of Justice’s Antitrust 
Division played a critical role in challenging these anticompetitive 
price-fixing agreements that injured American consumers.15 Cartel 
 
 9. HEXNER, supra note 3, at 66. 
 10. Id. at 367. 
 11. STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 1, at 95 (discussing example of potash cartel). 
 12. Id. at 256 (“Even where they are not coerced into doing do, American firms may find it 
expedient to join cartels. In Europe cartels regulated most lines of manufacture and wholesale 
distribution before the war. American firms with subsidiaries in European countries generally 
found it advantageous to conform to local practices.”). 
 13. Id. at 259 (“[American] producers who have learned to co-operate in regulating their 
foreign sales, and have found means of making their joint program effective, are not likely to 
forget what they have learned, when doing business in the home market.”). 
 14. MARCO BERTILORENZI, THE INTERNATIONAL ALUMINUM CARTEL, 1886–1978, at 55 
(2016); HEXNER, supra note 3, at 221 (“[M]any writers have felt that Canadian membership in 
the international cartel indirectly also bound Alcoa.”); STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 1, at 
206; see also HEXNER, supra note 3, at 217 (explaining corporate relationships in the aluminum 
market). 
 15. In addition to price fixing, American firms would sometimes agree with their European 
counterparts to divide international markets, such as when General Electric (GE) entered a cartel 
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activity in steel, aluminum, nitrogen, and potash, for example, were 
successfully challenged.16 Although most cartel activity is now illegal in 
Europe, international cartels continue to dominate many worldwide 
markets for necessary commodities and services.17 Despite the well-
documented history of legal foreign cartel activity transforming into 
illegal activity in the American market, federal judges of late have 
shown little appreciation for this history. They also seem to ignore how 
international cartels grow and expand into the United States to replace 
competitive markets that favor consumer interests with cartelized ones 
that artificially reduce output and raise prices. Today’s courts seem less 
concerned with the dangers posed by international price fixing, even 
though the harms inflicted by international cartels have grown.18 
Although price-fixing agreements remain per se illegal in the 
United States, courts have undermined the per se rule against price 
fixing by making it harder for plaintiffs to prove that an agreement to 
fix prices exists. In particular, American courts have a difficult time 
interpreting the significance of foreign price-fixing activity and its 
relevance to alleged domestic conspiracies to fix price. Judges too often 
discount or disregard the probative value of defendants fixing price in 
foreign markets in determining whether the same defendants have 
fixed price in the American market. This Article examines the legal 
significance of foreign price-fixing conduct in deciding claims of 
domestic price fixing and explains how most American courts have 
 
agreement with the Krupp Steel Works of Germany in 1928, pursuant to which GE “obtained 
exclusive control over the United States market” for tungsten. STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 
1, at 132. This tungsten cartel was eventually disrupted, in part, because the Department of Justice 
brought an antitrust indictment in 1941.  
 16. See, e.g., HEXNER, supra note 3, at 269 (noting consent decree against potash suppliers); 
id. at 329 (noting indictment against nitrogen cartel).  
 17. See Michal S. Gal, Free Movement of Judgments: Increasing Deterrence of International 
Cartels Through Jurisdictional Reliance, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 57, 59 (2010) (noting that international 
cartels had a large enough share of the market to make more than $260 billion in profits between 
1990 and 2005 by overcharging for necessary commodities). 
 18. John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, The Size of Cartel Overcharges: Implications for 
U.S. and EU Fining Policies, 51 ANTITRUST BULL. 983, 983 (2006). In 2013, for example, the 
federal government filed fifty new criminal antitrust cases and levied over one billion dollars in 
criminal fines. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Price Fixing Hits Home: An 
Empirical Study of US Price-Fixing Conspiracies, 48 REV. INDUS. ORG. 361, 361 (2016); see also 
Scott D. Hammond, Acting Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. for Criminal Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
An Overview of Recent Developments in the Antitrust Division’s Criminal Enforcement 
Program 2 (Jan. 10, 2005), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/517886/download [https://perma.cc/ 
7TPP-YSTU] (“Our investigations have uncovered meetings of international cartels in well over 
100 cities in more than 35 countries, including most of the Far East and nearly every country in 
Western Europe.”). 
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mishandled the issue. 
By “foreign price fixing” and “foreign cartels,” this Article refers 
to fixing prices in markets outside of the United States. The price-fixing 
firms may be based in the United States or abroad, but their activity is 
directed at fixing prices in foreign markets, not the American market. 
When using the phrases “domestic price fixing” and “domestic cartels,” 
this Article means that the defendants are fixing price in the American 
market, regardless of where the defendants are based. An international 
cartel refers to a price-fixing conspiracy that is operating in multiple 
countries, which may or may not yet include fixing price in the 
American market. 
Part I lays out the basics of American antitrust law. Agreements 
among competitors to fix price in the American marketplace are per se 
illegal. Plaintiffs alleging an illegal price-fixing agreement can use 
either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence to demonstrate that 
the defendants agreed to fix prices. Because direct evidence of price 
fixing is rarely available, most plaintiffs rely on circumstantial 
evidence. To establish a circumstantial case, the plaintiffs must show 
both that the defendants engaged in parallel pricing and that there are 
so-called plus factors that suggest this parallel pricing was the result of 
collusion. This requires courts to determine what constitutes a plus 
factor. 
Part II discusses whether the fact that the defendant corporations 
have engaged in price fixing in foreign markets is a plus factor for 
showing that the defendants also fixed price in the American market. 
Although some courts have held defendants’ fixing price in foreign 
markets to be relevant, most courts have not. These latter courts have 
advanced two main reasons for not treating the defendants’ price fixing 
in a foreign market as a plus factor. First, some courts have held that 
price fixing in a foreign market is not a plus factor unless the plaintiffs 
can prove that the defendants’ specific activities violated applicable 
foreign law. Second, most courts assert that there is no connection 
between defendants’ proven foreign price fixing and alleged price 
fixing in the American market. 
Part III examines the relationship between foreign and domestic 
price-fixing activity. After explaining the inherent difficulties in 
establishing a stable cartel, it shows how firms that have fixed prices in 
foreign markets are in a much better position to fix prices in the 
American marketplace. Cartels that fix prices outside of the United 
States facilitate cartels that fix prices in the United States because 
competitors who have already established a sufficient level of trust to 
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engage in price fixing abroad can leverage that trust they have 
developed in foreign jurisdictions and utilize it in their collusive activity 
in the United States. Next, this Part describes why cartels that fix prices 
in a foreign market would want to expand their price-fixing operations 
into the American market, despite the penalties associated with 
violating the Sherman Act. Among other advantages, expanding a 
cartel from foreign markets into the United States reduces the risk of 
arbitrage, stabilizes the cartel, and also helps conceal the conspiracy 
from global antitrust authorities. 
Part IV takes the insights from Part III and applies them to 
antitrust doctrine in order to demonstrate why defendants’ overseas 
price-fixing arrangements constitute a plus factor in litigation about 
price fixing in the American market. The discussion explains not only 
why the defendants’ foreign price fixing is a plus factor unto itself, but 
also why it satisfies other well-established plus factors, including the 
defendants’ motive and opportunity to conspire and the fact that the 
product market at issue is conducive to cartelization. Ultimately, if 
defendants have colluded in foreign markets, then their parallel pricing 
in the American market is more likely to be the product of collusion. 
Part IV then exposes the mistakes that courts make when 
concluding that defendants’ foreign price fixing is legally irrelevant. 
First, courts are incorrect to assert that foreign price fixing can only be 
a plus factor if it violates foreign law. Legality is not part of the plus-
factor analysis and inquiries into foreign law unnecessarily complicate 
the analysis. Second, when courts hold that there is no connection 
between foreign and domestic price fixing, their opinions display an 
unfamiliarity with how cartels—especially international cartels—
actually operate. This unawareness might be tolerable but for the fact 
that courts are making a more fundamental error by essentially 
requiring plaintiffs to supply direct evidence of domestic price fixing in 
order to present evidence of the defendants’ foreign activities as a plus 
factor. In so doing, courts seem not to understand how plus factors are 
used to construct a circumstantial case for inferring an agreement to fix 
prices. 
The Article concludes by encouraging courts to better understand 
how international price-fixing cartels operate. Defendants’ price fixing 
in foreign markets is relevant to claims that parallel pricing in the 
American market by these same defendants results from collusion. The 
foreign activity is not proof positive, but it is probative. And courts 
should treat it as so. 
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I.  PRICE-FIXING AGREEMENTS AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAW 
Price-fixing cartels inflict significant injuries on the national 
economy. By reducing output and increasing prices, cartels 
misappropriate billions of dollars from consumers and prevent millions 
of consumers from acquiring necessary products and services that these 
consumers could afford to purchase in a competitive market.19 In 
addition to these allocative inefficiencies, cartels create productive 
inefficiencies by insulating inefficient manufacturers from the 
pressures of competition, which increases the average production costs 
in an industry.20 
In recognition of these harms, Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
condemns agreements that unreasonably restrain trade.21 Although the 
Supreme Court has not articulated a single legal test for Section 1 
liability, most courts require an antitrust plaintiff to prove three 
elements: (1) An agreement; (2) that unreasonably restrains trade; and 
(3) has an effect on interstate commerce.22 Discussing these elements 
in reverse order, the third element is almost inherently present because 
courts are lenient in finding that an agreement affects interstate 
commerce.23 For the second element, courts have developed a deep 
body of common law for determining whether a challenged agreement 
constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade. Plaintiffs can prove the 
second element through one of three different legal tests: the per se 
rule, the quick look rule, or rule of reason.24 The per se rule is 
categorical and applies to agreements “that would always or almost 
always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.”25 If an 
 
 19. Economists refer to this form of inefficiency as deadweight loss. See generally 
Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Damages and Deadweight Loss, 51 ANTITRUST BULL. 521 (2006) 
(explaining deadweight loss and how antitrust law should address the problem). 
 20. GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRON W. WATKINS, CARTELS IN ACTION: CASE STUDIES 
IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DIPLOMACY 352 (1946) (“Cartel penalties and subsidies protected 
weaker producers and tended to raise average costs.”). 
 21. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). Section 1 of the Sherman Act litigation can be brought by either 
government officials or private plaintiffs. This Article focuses on private litigation because the 
judicial opinions discussing whether foreign price-fixing activity constitutes a plus factor are from 
private enforcement cases. 
 22. See, e.g., T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 632–33 (9th 
Cir. 1987); White & White, Inc. v. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 504 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 23. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Commerce Requirement in Tying Law, 100 IOWA L. REV. 
2135, 2143 (2015). 
 24. See CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, ANTITRUST LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 26–27 (2011) (explaining differences among the three modes of 
antitrust analysis). 
 25. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289–90 
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agreement falls in a per se category, it is deemed unreasonably 
anticompetitive—and, thus, illegal—as a matter of law, and the 
defendants are not entitled to proffer a defense that their agreement is 
justified by legitimate business reasons.26 Agreements among 
competitors to fix price are the quintessential case of per se illegality.27 
Because such horizontal price-fixing agreements are per se illegal, 
defendants who have made such an agreement cannot present a 
defense to justify their conduct.28 
With the second and third elements almost perfunctory in price-
fixing cases, liability usually turns on the first element: agreement. If 
the plaintiff can prove that the defendants agreed to fix price, antitrust 
liability is established.29 Thus, most price-fixing litigation focuses on the 
agreement element.30 
Antitrust plaintiffs can prove an agreement with either direct or 
circumstantial evidence.31 Direct evidence may take the form of 
testimony from cartel participants, such as confessions obtained 
through the Department of Justice Antitrust Division’s Amnesty 
 
(1985) (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979)).  
 26. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (stating agreements that fall in a 
per se category are “conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without 
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use”); 
see also Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 486 (1st Cir. 1988) (“[C]ertain 
anticompetitive practices, such as price fixing, so typically lack justification as to be per se 
unreasonable.”); United States v. Nu-Phonics, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 1006, 1012 (E.D. Mich. 1977) 
(“Once it has been determined that a particular course of action was a price-fixing conspiracy 
which affected interstate commerce—a per se violation of section 1—there is virtually no defense. 
The reasonableness of the price fixed is immaterial, as is any benevolent or constructive 
motivation for the scheme.”); Colo. Springs Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. State, 780 P.2d 494, 497 (Colo. 
1989) (“If a defendant’s acts constitute a per se antitrust violation, no justification based on a rule 
of reason analysis can alter that fact.”). 
 27. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 
(1984) (describing horizontal price fixing as “perhaps the paradigm of an unreasonable restraint 
of trade”). 
 28. The Supreme Court, however, has chipped away at the edges of the per se rule against 
horizontal price fixing. For example, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 
Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), the Court held that fixing prices does not necessarily constitute price 
fixing—as the latter term is used in antitrust jurisprudence—if the defendants’ agreement is 
necessary to create a new beneficial product that would not otherwise exist. Broad. Music, Inc., 
441 U.S. at 23–24. 
 29. Private plaintiffs must still prove antitrust injury and antitrust damages. Atl. Richfield 
Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990). 
 30. Illegal price fixing includes agreements to reduce or stabilize price, as well. United States 
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). Traditional price-fixing cases, however, 
involve conspiracies to raise price and this Article will focus on this form of conspiracy. 
 31. In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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Program, in which firms or individuals exchange confessions for 
leniency.32 Direct evidence of an agreement to fix prices is, however, 
generally not available because price fixers work to conceal their 
conspiracies.33 Recognizing this fact, courts do not require direct 
evidence that the defendants conspired to raise price.34 
Most antitrust plaintiffs rely on circumstantial evidence to 
establish the agreement element of a price-fixing claim. In antitrust 
jurisprudence, proving an agreement through circumstantial evidence 
involves two components. Plaintiffs must first prove conscious 
parallelism, which exists when competitors in a concentrated market 
price their products similarly because they recognize that the firms are 
interdependent and that their pricing decisions will influence their 
rivals’ pricing decisions.35 Conscious parallelism—generally in the form 
of the defendants’ parallel pricing of their products—is not enough to 
show an agreement.36 Plaintiffs must then also present plus factors, 
which are factors that tend to show that the defendants’ parallel 
conduct is the result of collusion, rather than of independent 
decisions.37 Plus factors are the critical linchpins in proving a price-
fixing agreement in antitrust litigation through circumstantial 
 
 32. See Christopher R. Leslie, Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue in Faithless Agents, 
49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1621, 1665–67 (2008). 
 33. See, e.g., In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., No. MISC 99-197, 2000 WL 1475705, at *3 
(D.D.C. May 9, 2000) (alleged price fixers’ acts of concealment included holding “secret meetings, 
confining the conspiracy plan to a small group of key officials at each company, avoiding 
references in documents or the creation of documents which would reveal these antitrust 
violations, destroying documents, using codes to conceal the identity of co-conspirators, and 
providing false information to law enforcement authorities”); JOHN G. FULLER, THE 
GENTLEMAN CONSPIRATORS: THE STORY OF THE PRICE-FIXERS IN THE ELECTRICAL 
INDUSTRY 13 (1962) (discussing concealment methods of electrical equipment cartels).  
 34. In re Text Messaging, 630 F.3d at 629 (“Direct evidence of conspiracy is not a sine qua 
non, however. Circumstantial evidence can establish an antitrust conspiracy.”). 
 35. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993) 
(describing conscious parallelism as “the process, not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a 
concentrated market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a profit-
maximizing, supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic interests and their 
interdependence with respect to price and output decisions”). 
 36. In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 1999).  
 37. In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 360 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[E]xistence of these 
plus factors tends to ensure that courts punish ‘concerted action’—an actual agreement—instead 
of the ‘unilateral, independent conduct of competitors.’” (quoting In re Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 
122)); Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Del. Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1232 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(“[A] plaintiff also must demonstrate the existence of certain ‘plus’ factors, for only when these 
additional factors are present does the evidence tend to exclude the possibility that the defendants 
acted independently.”). 
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evidence.38 In the absence of direct evidence of an agreement, antitrust 
plaintiffs need to plead plus factors in order to survive a motion to 
dismiss.39 Thus, whether a court treats a particular circumstance as a 
plus factor can be dispositive of a plaintiff’s price-fixing claim. 
No single exhaustive, definitive catalog of plus factors exists.40 The 
most commonly listed plus factors include: “a motive to conspire,” 
“evidence that the defendants acted contrary to their economic self-
interest,” and “evidence of a traditional conspiracy, such as a high level 
of interfirm communications that would suggest that the defendants 
consciously agreed not to compete.”41 Other plus factors include that 
the defendants operate in a concentrated market with a structure 
conducive to collusion, that the defendants have proffered pretextual 
explanations for their conduct, and that the defendants have shared 
price information with each other.42 Courts have not precisely defined 
any number or set of plus factors that must be present to infer an 
agreement to fix prices. No particular plus factor is required, and a 
single plus factor may be sufficient.43 Fact finders are supposed to 
evaluate the bundle of plus factors proffered by the plaintiff and then 
determine whether these factors—when collectively considered—
demonstrate that the defendants did, in fact, agree to fix prices.44 
II.  JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF CONSPIRACIES TO FIX PRICE IN 
FOREIGN MARKETS AS A PLUS FACTOR 
The plus-factor approach to proving an agreement requires courts 
to determine what constitutes a plus factor. This Article addresses 
whether defendants’ price-fixing activity in foreign markets can be a 
 
 38. In re Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 122 (describing plus factors as “necessary conditions for the 
conspiracy inference”). 
 39. Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Citigroup, Inc., 709 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 40. In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 360 (“The question then becomes, what are ‘plus factors’ that 
suffice to defeat summary judgment? There is no finite set of such criteria; no exhaustive list 
exists.”); In re Pool Prods. Distribution Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 988 F. Supp. 2d 696, 711 (E.D. La. 
2013) (“There is no finite or exhaustive list of plus factors, and different courts articulate the 
relevant factors in different ways.”). 
 41. In re Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust Litig., 681 F. Supp. 2d 141, 
166–67 (D. Conn. 2009). 
 42. In re Pool Prods. Distribution, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 711–12; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ANTITRUST LAW 55–93 (2d ed. 2001) (listing plus factors). 
 43. Baker v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 823 N.E.2d 93, 106 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (“[E]vidence of 
a single plus factor can suffice to support an inference of conspiracy . . . .”). 
 44. In re Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust Litig., 221 F. Supp. 3d 46, 58 (D.D.C. 2016) 
(“‘Plus factors’ must be evaluated holistically.”). 
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plus factor for proving an agreement to fix prices in the American 
market. This Article does not address foreign-based conspiracies to fix 
prices in the U.S. market. These are clearly illegal. The Supreme Court 
has long held that “it is well established by now that the Sherman Act 
applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact 
produce some substantial effect in the United States.”45 This Article 
instead focuses on whether conspiracies to fix prices in foreign 
jurisdictions provide evidence of the existence of an additional price-
fixing conspiracy by the same companies in the American marketplace. 
Courts have not sung from the same hymnbook on this issue. 
Many courts have recognized that participation in a price-fixing 
conspiracy in one market is a plus factor in determining whether those 
participants also agreed to fix price in another market.46 Some courts 
have applied this reasoning to foreign price-fixing activity, holding that 
“[e]vidence of cooperation between Defendants in foreign price-fixing, 
through a trade association or otherwise, would certainly be relevant 
to establish the existence of an illegal combination or conspiracy in 
restraint of trade, which is a required element of a § 1 Sherman Act 
claim.”47 Most courts to consider the issue, however, have failed to 
appreciate the significance of the defendants’ price fixing outside the 
United States. This Part examines how courts considering allegations 
of domestic price fixing have generally discounted or disregarded the 
probative value of the defendants’ participation in conspiracies to fix 
prices abroad. 
A. Foreign Price Fixing Considered Irrelevant Unless Illegal 
Several courts have held that antitrust defendants’ alleged 
participation in a price-fixing cartel outside the United States cannot 
constitute a plus factor unless that alleged foreign activity would have 
 
 45. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993). 
 46. United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 666 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating defendants’ 
participation in a citric-acid price-fixing conspiracy was relevant in a criminal case against 
participants in a lysine price-fixing conspiracy); In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 
2d 987, 1011 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (“[G]uilty pleas in one market are suggestive of the plausibility of 
a conspiracy to commit the same illegal acts in another market.”); In re Static Random Access 
Memory (SRAM) Antitrust Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 896, 903 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (stating guilty pleas 
of price fixing in the Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) market “support an inference 
of a conspiracy in the SRAM industry”); Eddins v. Redstone, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863, 877 n.11 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2005) (recognizing “proved conspiracy or competition in other markets or times” as a 
plus factor). 
 47. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., No. 1426, 2004 WL 7200711, at *3 (E.D. 
Pa. Oct. 29, 2004). 
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violated the foreign jurisdiction’s competition law.48 Most notably, in 
Williamson Oil Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA,49 plaintiff retailers 
claimed that the defendant tobacco manufacturers had conspired to fix 
prices in the American market. Plaintiffs sought to prove an agreement 
through circumstantial evidence. Among other plus factors,50 the 
plaintiffs asserted that the defendants’ agreements to fix prices in 
foreign markets constituted a plus factor for proving a conspiracy to fix 
prices in the United States.51 In particular, the plaintiffs argued that the 
defendants had been fixing tobacco prices in Argentina, Canada, Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Hungary, Saudi Arabia, and 
Venezuela.52 
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that the defendants’ 
alleged foreign price fixing constituted a plus factor. This holding 
flowed naturally from the appellate court’s decision to affirm a ruling 
that the plaintiffs’ evidence of foreign price fixing was inadmissible 
because they “had failed to show that any of the actions allegedly 
undertaken by [the defendants] overseas were illegal under the 
applicable foreign law.”53 The Eleventh Circuit both affirmed the 
district court’s ruling and criticized the plaintiffs for “fail[ing] to 
establish that the foreign conduct was a crime or wrong under the laws 
of the foreign sovereigns.”54 Because of this failure to prove foreign 
illegality, the Eleventh Circuit held that the “alleged evidence of 
foreign agreements to collude does not rise to the level of a plus 
factor.”55 
The appellate panel also faulted the plaintiffs for not showing 
“some palpable tie between these overseas activities and appellees’ 
pricing actions in the United States.”56 The absence of a tangible link 
between the domestic and foreign conspiracies is hardly surprising 
given that the district court forbade the antitrust plaintiffs from serving 
 
 48. What the United States calls “antitrust law,” many foreign jurisdictions refer to as 
“competition law.” This Article uses the terms interchangeably.  
 49. Williamson Oil Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 50. The plaintiffs also alleged other plus factors, including price signaling, actions against 
individual interest, collective monitoring of sales, participation in other non-price conspiracies, a 
market structure conducive to collusion, the history of price fixing in the tobacco industry, 
opportunities to conspire, and others. Id. at 1305–19. 
 51. Id. at 1316–17. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 1316. 
 54. Id. at 1317. 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id.  
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discovery requests “relating to price-fixing episodes in foreign 
countries” unless they first proved that the foreign price-fixing 
agreements were illegal “under clearly-established statutes of the 
foreign jurisdiction, or, if the country is a common law jurisdiction, 
under the common law of the jurisdiction.”57 Furthermore, the district 
judge held that the plaintiffs could receive no discovery absent “direct 
evidence [of] one or more price fixing episodes in that country during 
the operative discovery period,” which coincided roughly with the 
period of the defendants’ alleged price fixing in the United States.58 
How the plaintiffs could acquire this direct evidence absent discovery, 
the district court did not address. 
The Eleventh Circuit approach to evidence of foreign price-fixing 
activity proved persuasive in subsequent state court cases considering 
antitrust claims brought against the Williamson defendants.59 For 
example, the Kansas appellate court in Smith v. Philip Morris 
Companies, Inc.,60 granted summary judgment to the defendants after 
holding that the defendants’ alleged foreign price fixing did not 
constitute a plus factor. As in Williamson, the plaintiffs in Smith argued 
that the defendants’ foreign price-fixing activity constituted a plus 
factor that showed that the defendants’ parallel pricing was “not 
merely the natural and wholly legal interdependent but independent 
pricing practices that occur in an oligopoly, but rather it was the 
product of an illegal agreement to fix the domestic wholesale price of 
cigarettes.”61 Invoking Williamson, the Kansas court held that the 
“Plaintiffs have not established that any alleged price-fixing activities 
by Defendants that underlie their allegations here were, in fact, 
unlawful under foreign law.”62 Thus, the court deprived the defendants’ 
foreign price fixing of any probative value unless the plaintiffs could 
prove that it violated foreign law. 
B. Foreign Price Fixing Discounted as Disconnected 
Even when plaintiffs prove that defendants’ price fixing abroad is 
illegal, courts discount the significance of foreign price fixing by failing 
 
 57. Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1312 (N.D. 
Ga. 2002), aff’d sub nom., Williamson Oil Co., 346 F.3d 1287.  
 58. Id.  
 59. See, e.g., Romero v. Philip Morris Inc., 242 P.3d 280, 297 (N.M. 2010). 
 60. Smith v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 335 P.3d 644 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014). 
 61. Id. at 673. 
 62. Id. at 674. 
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to see—in the words of the Williamson court—a “palpable link” 
between foreign price-fixing activity and the alleged price fixing in the 
American marketplace. For example, in In re Chocolate Confectionary 
Antitrust Litigation,63 the plaintiffs sued Hershey’s, Nestle, and Mars 
for fixing the prices of chocolate products in the American market. 
Lacking direct evidence of price fixing, the plaintiffs relied on 
circumstantial evidence.64 They established conscious parallelism by 
showing that “on three separate occasions between December of 2002 
and April of 2007, when one defendant initiated a price increase on 
single and king size chocolate bars, the other two defendants followed 
immediately with similar price increases.”65 The price increases were 
identical, except once when the increase varied “only by two-tenths of 
a penny.”66 The district court noted that the defendants “do not—and 
cannot—contest the fact that their price increases were synchronized 
and parallel throughout the alleged conspiracy period.”67 The 
defendants essentially conceded that this parallelism was conscious, 
but argued that “each company’s pricing action was reactive,” not 
collusive.68 
After establishing conscious parallelism, the plaintiffs alleged plus 
factors, including that the defendants had illegally conspired to fix the 
price of chocolate in the Canadian marketplace, pursuant to a series of 
secret meetings.69 These agreements violated Canadian competition 
law; indeed, the court noted that “the Canadian Competition Bureau 
criminally charged the Canadian manufacturers—three of whom share 
parent corporations with the domestic defendants—with conspiring to 
restrict competition and fix prices for chocolate products.”70 At the 
time that the district judge was entertaining the defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment, Hershey Canada had already pled guilty to one 
count of price fixing and the antitrust charges against Nestle’s and 
Mars’ Canadian operations remained active.71 The plaintiffs relied 
heavily on the Canadian chocolate conspiracy to demonstrate that the 
 
 63. In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 64. Id. at 398. 
 65. In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 999 F. Supp. 2d 777, 787 (M.D. Pa. 2014), 
aff’d, 801 F.3d 383 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 66. Id. at 788. 
 67. Id. at 787. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 784. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id.  
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parallel price movements in the American chocolate market were also 
the product of a conspiracy.72 
The district court expressed suspicion about the probative value 
of the defendants’ foreign price-fixing conspiracies. The judge began 
by quoting Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp’s Antitrust Law treatise 
for the proposition that “[a]nticompetitive conduct ‘elsewhere in time 
or place does not generally allow the inference of an immediate 
conspiracy.’”73 The court required a “reliable, factual link between 
foreign and domestic conduct” in order to consider “foreign conduct 
as a plus factor for liability purposes.”74 The district court ultimately 
rejected the defendants’ price-fixing activities in Canada as a plus 
factor, finding the plaintiffs’ allegations “entirely devoid of any facts 
establishing a plausible, much less a palpable, tie between the 
Canadian . . . conspiracy and domestic pricing decisions.”75 
The Third Circuit affirmed both the district court’s approach and 
its conclusion. The appellate panel reasoned that the plaintiffs failed to 
“adequately link[] the Canadian conspiracy to the purported U.S. 
conspiracy”76 because the alleged conspiracies involved different 
people, different legal entities, and different circumstances.77 Absent a 
sufficient link between the two conspiracies, the Third Circuit held the 
foreign price fixing not to be a plus factor and it affirmed summary 
judgment for the defendants.78 The court did not view the same 
companies engaging in the same parallel pricing in the same products 
as showing a link between the proven and the alleged conspiracies that 
straddled one border.79 
The “no connection” reasoning for rejecting the defendants’ 
foreign price fixing as a plus factor reached its nadir when the Second 
 
 72. Id. at 797 (“The foundation of plaintiffs’ claims rests largely on their hypothesis that 
alleged and partially proven anticompetitive conduct in Canada somehow facilitated a price-fixing 
conspiracy in the United States.”). 
 73. Id. at 798 (quoting 6 PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: 
AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1421a (3d ed. 2012)). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id.  
 76. In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 403–04 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 77. Id. at 404. With respect to the third dissimilarity, the court distinguished the Canadian 
conspiracy from the alleged American one because the former cartel had a distributor serve as its 
ringleader and because the Canadian cartel included an agreement to restrict discounting as well 
as to fix prices. Id. 
 78. Id. at 412. 
 79. For an explanation of why the court’s failure to see a connection was in error, see infra 
Part IV.B.2. 
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Circuit applied this rationale to dismiss a price-fixing claim. In In re 
Elevator Antitrust Litigation,80 the plaintiffs alleged price fixing in the 
American market for elevator sales and maintenance. The plaintiffs 
accused the defendants of engaging in “standardized practices,” 
including “standard price lists and contracts for maintenance and 
repair of elevators, which include similar language and terms.”81 This 
constituted conscious parallelism. As for plus factors, the plaintiffs 
alleged that “the elevator industry is an oligopoly, dominated by a 
small number of manufacturers, with the four defendants controlling 
75% of the market for elevator sales and maintenance,” which are 
“economic conditions conducive to anticompetitive behavior.”82 In 
addition to these structural plus factors, the plaintiffs also alleged that 
behavioral aspects of the elevator industry facilitated collusion, 
describing the industry as “closely knit” and alleging “that defendants 
belong to many of the same trade groups and associations, the frequent 
meetings of which provide numerous opportunities for defendants to 
reach collusive agreements.”83 These represent accepted plus factors 
for proving an agreement. 
As part of its circumstantial case to show an agreement among the 
defendants, the plaintiffs also cited the defendants’ anticompetitive 
activities in European markets. Following raids on the defendants’ 
European subsidiaries’ offices, the European Commission issued a 
statement that it had “good reason to believe that the manufacturers 
[including defendants . . .] may have shared between themselves the 
tenders for sale & installation of elevators & escalators and may have 
colluded to restrict competition with regard to after-sales services.”84 
Two of the defendants had admitted to illegally fixing prices with their 
competitors.85 The plaintiffs presented this foreign activity as a plus 
factor. 
The district court denied any probative value to the defendants’ 
illegal activity in the European marketplace, asserting that “[t]here are 
no facts alleged to suggest that defendants did not compete against one 
another in regard to the sale of elevators and the pricing of such sales” 
 
 80. In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 81. In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., No. 04 CV 1178, 2006 WL 1470994, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 
30, 2006), aff’d, 502 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at *7 (alteration in original). 
 85. Id.  
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in the United States.86 The district judge further held that the European 
Commission’s “investigations of defendants’ subsidiaries’ business 
practices in Europe are patently insufficient” to permit the plaintiffs’ 
antitrust claims to proceed.87 The court first asserted that there had 
“not, in fact, been any finding of wrongdoing by any regulatory or 
judicial body of law in Europe.”88 This reasoning is odd given that two 
of the entities had admitted to illegal price fixing.89 An uncoerced 
admission of guilt would seem to be even more persuasive than a 
“finding” of price fixing because the former is less likely to be in error. 
The court then asserted that “despite the admission by certain 
defendants of illegal conduct in certain European countries, there is no 
basis from which to infer that those localized investigations or 
proceedings implicate defendants in the far broader conspiracy 
plaintiffs allege with respect to the U.S. markets.”90 The district court 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint without leave to replead.91 
The Second Circuit affirmed, speculating that the defendants’ 
similar pricing and similar contract terms could have occurred in a 
competitive market.92 The appellate court conceded that subsequent to 
the plaintiffs’ initial complaint, “extraordinary fines have been levied 
 
 86. Id. at *10 (emphasis added). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at *7 (“At oral argument, counsel for defendants conceded that Otis has admitted 
that some of its employees in certain local Markets in Europe have violated the law, but asserted 
that such violations were confined to four European countries.”); see also id. (“The Complaint 
further alleges that, the following day, March 18, 2004, World Markets Analysis reported that 
Kone Corporation had admitted on March 17, 2004 that it had engaged in anti-competitive 
activities at its subsidiaries in Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg by fixing prices.”). 
 90. Id. at *10. 
 91. The district court condemned the plaintiffs’ allegations as lacking specification and being 
“nothing more than a list of theoretical possibilities, which one could postulate without knowing 
any facts whatever.” Id. at *3. The district court also condemned the complaint for failing to allege 
“what elevators a specific plaintiff purchased from any defendant or defendants” or that specific 
plaintiffs were overcharged. Id. If the court were holding that the plaintiffs’ lack of specificity with 
respect to the purchases and pricing is itself fatal, then the European price fixing might not 
compensate for this omission in the pleading. But the court did not treat the plaintiffs’ oversight 
as warranting dismissal in and of itself. Rather, the court condemned the deficiency of details and 
then branded the defendant’s European price fixing as irrelevant and unrelated. 
 92. In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Similar contract terms can 
reflect similar bargaining power and commercial goals (not to mention boilerplate); similar 
contract language can reflect the copying of documents that may not be secret; similar pricing can 
suggest competition at least as plausibly as it can suggest anticompetitive conspiracy.”). The 
Second Circuit’s treatment of the defendants’ similar pricing and terms is perplexing because it 
seemed to treat—and reject—them as plus factors, but failed to appreciate that these similarities 
establish conscious parallelism, the step that precedes the plus-factor analysis.  
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by the European Commission against defendants and their affiliates 
for various antitrust violations.”93 This would seem to rebuff the district 
court’s argument that there had been no finding of antitrust liability in 
Europe. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit reasoned that “[a]llegations 
of anticompetitive wrongdoing in Europe—absent any evidence of 
linkage between such foreign conduct and conduct here—is merely to 
suggest, in defendants’ words, that ‘if it happened there, it could have 
happened here.’”94 The court held that the plaintiffs failed to 
adequately allege “facts linking transactions in Europe to transactions 
and effects here” in the United States and, thus, the conspiracy alleged 
in the plaintiffs’ complaint was not plausible and could not survive the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss.95 
In addition to these opinions from the Second, Third, and 
Eleventh Circuits, many state courts have cited a lack of connection 
between an alleged domestic conspiracy and foreign price-fixing 
activities in order to prevent plaintiffs’ price-fixing claims from 
advancing to trial.96 None of these opinions have suggested what makes 
a link sufficiently “palpable” to treat the defendants’ foreign price 
fixing as a plus factor in a domestic antitrust case. Nor have they hinted 
at the quantum of evidence necessary to demonstrate this link. Part III 
explains why this link is inherent given how price-fixing cartels operate. 
III.  THE ROLE OF AGREEMENTS TO FIX PRICES ABROAD IN 
AMERICAN PRICE-FIXING CONSPIRACIES 
The federal and state court opinions rejecting defendants’ foreign 
 
 93. Id. at 51 n.6 (citing Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Supplemental Letter Brief at 3, In re Elevator 
Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47 (No. 06-3128-cv)). 
 94. Id. at 51–52. 
 95. Id. (“Without an adequate allegation of facts linking transactions in Europe to 
transactions and effects here, plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations do not ‘nudge [their] claims across 
the line from conceivable to plausible.’” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 
1974 (2007))). 
 96. See, e.g., Smith v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 335 P.3d 644, 674 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014) (“Nor 
have plaintiffs produced any evidence of any ‘palpable tie’ between the tobacco companies’ 
overseas activities and the pricing actions in the United States that underlie the price-fixing claim 
in this case.”); Romero v. Philip Morris, Inc., 242 P.3d 280, 297 (N.M. 2010) (“The alleged 
conspiratorial meetings in other markets cannot serve as tending to exclude independent conduct 
because Plaintiffs offered no support to connect the actions in foreign markets with the actions in 
the United States.”); Ren v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., No. 00–004035–CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept. 10, 
2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“[G]enerally, the existence of conspiracies in another 
country, without more, does not support an inference of a conspiracy to fix prices in the United 
States. . . . [P]laintiffs have not shown evidence linking these foreign [price-fixing] activities to 
those undertaken by the defendants . . . in the United States.”). 
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price-fixing activities as a plus factor share a significant similarity. They 
all omit any discussion of how price-fixing conspiracies actually 
operate. Plus-factor analysis is supposed to help determine whether the 
defendants’ parallel pricing behavior is the product of independent 
decisionmaking or of collusion. But this determination is not possible 
without understanding how price-fixing cartels function. Price-fixing 
cartels are difficult to form because rival firms must agree on several 
details—including price, output, and relative market shares—often 
across a wide range of products. These firms that are naturally 
competitors must also learn to trust each other not to cheat on the 
cartel and not to expose the cartel to enforcement officials. Once cartel 
members learn how to manage a cartel in a limited geographic market, 
they can expand their conspiracy into other markets. Indeed, cartels 
have many strong incentives to have their price-fixing operations 
include the United States. By incorporating the American market into 
their cartel’s sphere of control, the conspirators can increase their 
profits and reduce the risks of arbitrage and exposure of the cartel to 
antitrust enforcement agencies. This Part explains how cartels are 
formed and managed, as well as how and why they expand 
geographically, including into the United States. 
A. The Difficulty of Price Fixing and the Fragility of Cartels 
Price fixing involves much more than meeting once to set a price 
and then collecting cartel profits for the foreseeable future. Cartels 
often must set multiple prices on multiple products in multiple 
markets.97 To prevent cheating, cartels may also try to set production 
limits, another term about which cartel partners may vociferously 
disagree.98 Negotiations over quotas can impede initiation of a cartel 
agreement99 and such negotiations can destabilize a cartel.100 After the 
 
 97. See Herbert Hovenkamp & Christopher R. Leslie, The Firm as Cartel Manager, 64 
VAND. L. REV. 813, 827–28 (2011) (discussing examples). 
 98. See James M. Griffin, Previous Cartel Experience: Any Lessons For OPEC?, in 
ECONOMICS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: AN ECLECTIC APPROACH 179, 185 (Lawrence R. Klein 
& Jaime Marquez eds., 1989) (“Due to cost differences, discount rates, reserve levels, and market 
shares, each firm may desire a different market price and output.”). 
 99. JOHN E. STEALEY III, THE ANTEBELLUM KANAWHA SALT BUSINESS AND WESTERN 
MARKETS 84 (1993) (discussing the Kanawha salt cartel); Griffin, supra note 98, at 198; Harm G. 
Schröter, The International Dyestuffs Cartel, 1927–1939, with Special Reference to the Developing 
Areas of Europe and Japan, in INTERNATIONAL CARTELS IN BUSINESS HISTORY 33, 48 (Akira 
Kudō & Terushi Hara eds., 1992) (discussing the European Steel Cartel). 
 100. See Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Studies of Cartel Stability: A 
Comparison of Methodological Approaches, in HOW CARTELS ENDURE AND HOW THEY FAIL: 
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cartel is operating, the firms must continue to negotiate with each other 
about ongoing details.101 
Even when competitors in a market can actually launch a cartel, 
success is not guaranteed because price-fixing cartels are inherently 
unstable. In the long run, firms in a cartel maximize their profits by 
fixing an above-market price and honoring their cartel commitments. 
The firms essentially operate as a jointly held monopoly—reducing 
output, raising price, and then distributing the monopoly profits (i.e., 
cartel profits) among the members of the price-fixing conspiracy.102 
Despite these long-run incentives, the short run is always a 
consideration. And in the short run, a firm in a cartel may maximize its 
own profits by cheating on the cartel. By charging a lower-than-cartel 
price and selling more than its cartel allotment, a firm can achieve 
higher profits than it could either by honoring its cartel commitments 
or by competing in a free market. In game-theory parlance, cheating 
on a cartel is a dominant strategy, meaning that regardless of whether 
one’s cartel partners are honoring or cheating on the cartel agreement, 
each individual firm is probably better off cheating in the short term.103 
The urge to cheat may be overwhelming when a firm needs capital 
quickly104 or in periods of slack demand.105 This threat of cheating 
makes cartels intrinsically insecure.106 
Cheating on a cartel agreement, however, does not necessarily 
lead to the cartel’s permanent demise. When cartel arrangements fall 
apart, the price fixers generally regroup, assess their situation, and 
relaunch their cartel with new understandings and enforcement 
 
STUDIES OF INDUSTRIAL COLLUSION 9, 36 (Peter Z. Grossman ed., 2004) (“Bargaining problems 
were much more likely to undermine collusion than was secret cheating.”). 
 101. See, e.g., STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 20, at 420 (discussing the chemical cartels of 
the mid-twentieth century).  
 102. This, of course, assumes that the cartel is not caught, prosecuted, and held accountable 
to its victims. But even then—after paying criminal and civil fines, and private damages and 
settlements—price-fixing firms may still find cartelization to be net profitable. See John M. 
Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays, 34 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 427, 431–34 (2012). 
 103. See Leslie, supra note 7, at 524–27 (discussing how price fixing is a prisoner’s dilemma in 
which cheating is the dominant strategy). 
 104. See, e.g., STEALEY, supra note 99, at 162. 
 105. See, e.g., STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 20, at 207 (noting the experience of the steel 
cartel). 
 106. Peter Huber, Competition, Conglomerates, and the Evolution of Cooperation, 93 YALE 
L.J. 1147, 1149 (1984) (“Because firms can collect greater rewards by defecting from collusive 
agreements than by adhering to them, cooperation is fragile and unstable, competition robust and 
inevitable.” (footnote omitted)). 
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mechanisms in place.107 Each iteration of a cartel arrangement tends to 
be longer and more robust as the conspirators learn to cooperate.108 
For many price-fixing cartels, the difference between long-term 
success and failure is a function of whether the cartel members 
sufficiently trust each other. Business relationships often require trust. 
Professor Carol Rose notes that “without trust, we could not undertake 
any cooperative ventures, from the most trivial to the most cosmic.”109 
To the extent that a business venture entails risk, trust makes risk-
taking rational.110 Trust is even more important in illegal business 
ventures, like price fixing, because they involve greater dangers, 
including the risks of criminal fines, prison time, and substantial civil 
liability.111 As in any business relationship, trust has significant value 
for firms in a cartel.112 
Stable cartels require that firms resist their desire to maximize 
short-term profits by cheating on the cartel agreement. Trust is critical 
for price-fixing firms to be able to reap the long-term profits of 
participating in a durable cartel.113 If a firm cannot trust its cartel 
partners to abide by the cartel agreement, then it is better off 
withdrawing from the cartel. If a firm’s cartel partners are cheating on 
the price-fixing agreement, then the worst thing that a firm can do is to 
 
 107. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 100, at 17 (“Some cartels re-formed several times within 
a very short span of years, while others went off and on over 50 years or more. In some cases, such 
as the copper cartel, each period of cartelization appears to endure for longer than the previous 
one.”). 
 108. Id. at 27 (“[C]artels reappear in some industries, and cartel duration tends to increase 
with industry experience with collusion, although patterns in cartel duration can vary 
substantially . . . .”); see also id. at 33 (“[F]irms did learn to cooperate during the [National 
Industrial Recovery Act] period in ways that improved their ability to limit price competition 
even after explicit collusion was prohibited.”). 
 109. Carol M. Rose, Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. REV. 531, 534 (1995).  
 110. See JAMES M. KOUZES & BARRY Z. POSNER, THE LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE: HOW TO 
GET EXTRAORDINARY THINGS DONE IN ORGANIZATIONS 21 (4th ed. 2007) (“Authentic 
leadership is founded on trust, and the more people trust their leader, and each other, the more 
they take risks, make changes, and keep organizations and movements alive.”). 
 111. See Annette Baier, Trust and Antitrust, 96 ETHICS 231, 231–32 (1986) (“Exploitation and 
conspiracy, as much as justice and fellowship, thrive better in an atmosphere of trust.”); Helen 
Nissenbaum, Securing Trust Online: Wisdom or Oxymoron?, 81 B.U. L. REV. 635, 642 (2001) 
(“Trust between partners in crime increases the chances of criminal success.”).  
 112. See Peter C. Carstensen, While Antitrust Was Out to Lunch: Lessons from the 1980s for 
the Next Century of Enforcement, 48 SMU L. REV. 1881, 1888 (1995) (“If A and B can each trust 
each other, they will share the cartel profit.”). 
 113. See Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 100, at 19 (“The expectations that participants have 
about competitors’ propensity to cooperate can make all the difference in whether collusion is 
successful or not.”). 
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honor the agreement by continuing to charge the cartel price, while 
losing one’s customers to firms charging less than the cartel price.114 
Cartels can solve the instability problem by creating trust among the 
cartel members.115 Such trust allows cartels to be more nimble, to adapt 
to changing market conditions.116 As with legitimate business, trust can 
reduce the transactions costs of cartel negotiations and operations.117 
In contrast, distrust can prevent cartel formation and cause existing 
cartels to disintegrate into competition as perceived cheating 
precipitates actual cheating.118 
Cartel ringleaders have to work to create and nurture mutual trust 
among coconspirators. Trust is not the natural state of affairs for rivals 
in a competitive market, even when these rivals are contemplating 
supplanting competition with cartelization. Each member of a cartel 
knows that its cartel partners’ dominant strategy is to maximize their 
profits by cheating on the cartel agreement.119 The following Sections 
explain how beginning price-fixing efforts in a foreign jurisdiction can 
facilitate the construction of a stable cartel in the American 
marketplace. 
B. Foreign Conspiracies and Cartel Creep 
Participating in a cartel that fixes prices in foreign markets makes 
it easier to create a cartel in the United States. Historically, small 
 
 114. Leslie, supra note 7, at 521. 
 115. Successful cartels have firms that trust each other. They trust each other not to cheat on 
the agreement by charging less than the agreed upon price, not to sell more than they allotted 
quota, and not to expose the cartel to antitrust authorities in exchange for leniency. Christopher 
R. Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory and Cartel Stability, 31 J. CORP. L. 453, 461–65 (2006).  
 116. Leslie, supra note 7, at 549–51 (discussing several examples); see also JOHN CONNOR, 
GLOBAL PRICE FIXING: OUR CUSTOMERS ARE THE ENEMY 225 (2001) (“[R]elatively trustful 
relations are required for cartels to operate effectively.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 117. Leslie, supra note 7, at 550–51; see also Edward H. Lorenz, Neither Friends nor Strangers: 
Informal Networks of Subcontracting in French Industry, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING 
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 194, 198 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988) (“If transaction costs are 
thought of as friction in the economy, then trust can be seen as an extremely effective lubricant.”); 
Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 553 (2001) (“Trust is a kind of social glue 
that allows people to interact at low transaction costs.”); Denise M. Rousseau, Sim B. Sitkin, 
Ronald S. Burt & Colin Camerer, Not so Different After All: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust, 23 
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 393, 396 (1998) (“Similarly, transaction cost economists view trust as a cause 
of reduced opportunism among transacting parties, which results in lower transaction costs.”). 
 118. Leslie, supra note 7, at 552–53 (discussing lysine, uranium, and rayon cartels). 
 119. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Reciprocal Altruism as a Felony: Antitrust and the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1906, 1916–17 (1988) (“Both firms prefer the high price that a 
monopolist would select if a single firm controlled the entire soft drink market, yet each distrusts 
the other’s willingness to cooperate by maintaining that high price.”). 
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cartels grow into larger cartels as they expand geographically and into 
new product lines. For example, the American-based heavy equipment 
cartel of the 1950s began by rigging bids for a limited range of products 
and then eventually grew into a significantly larger conspiracy across 
twenty different major product lines.120 The multibillion-dollar 
international vitamin cartel of the 1990s expanded both geographically 
and across product lines.121 Starting with a few vitamin categories in the 
European market, the cartel eventually swelled to encompass over 
twenty product lines across the globe, including in the United States. 
This cartel creep—by which successful cartels extend their reach until 
they encircle the globe—is common. 
This Section explores three related mechanisms by which foreign 
cartels facilitate price-fixing conspiracies in the American market. 
1. Foreign Conspiracies and the Creation of Trust.  Foreign cartel 
activity accelerates the creation and success of price-fixing conspiracies 
on American soil by allowing business rivals to develop mutual trust in 
other jurisdictions—many with relatively weak antitrust enforcement 
regimes or none at all—before bringing their conspiracy to the United 
States. As explained above, trust is often critical for cartel success.122 
This Section discusses several conditions that help establish trust and 
shows how foreign price fixing creates these conditions. 
Several factors increase the trustworthiness of individuals and 
firms. Trust is often a learned behavior that develops gradually over 
time. When individuals cooperate with each other, it builds trust that 
can facilitate greater cooperation in the future.123 As Nobel Prize-
winning economist Thomas Schelling has noted: “Trust is often 
achieved simply by the continuity of the relation between parties and 
 
 120. Wayne E. Baker & Robert R. Faulkner, The Social Organization of Conspiracy: Illegal 
Networks in the Heavy Electrical Equipment Industry, 58 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 837, 838 
(1993). 
 121. Some historic cartels, including those in steel and electrical equipment, were umbrella 
cartels that controlled production quotas and pricing in several different product markets. See 
Daniel Barbezat, A Price for Every Product, Every Place: The International Steel Export Cartel, 
1933–39, 33 BUS. HIST. 68, 69 (1991).  
 122. See supra notes 91–101 and accompanying text. 
 123. See ANATOL RAPOPORT & ALBERT M. CHAMMAH, PRISONER’S DILEMMA: A STUDY 
IN CONFLICT AND COOPERATION 201 (1965) (“Thus learning goes both ways in Prisoner’s 
Dilemma. First the subjects learn not to trust each other; then they learn to trust each other.”); 
ROBERT WRIGHT, NONZERO: THE LOGIC OF HUMAN DESTINY 342 (2000) (“[B]y observing what 
a given player had done on the last occasion, another player could, in effect, gather information 
about the player’s likely future behavior.”). 
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the recognition by each that what he might gain by cheating in a given 
instance is outweighed by the value of the tradition of trust that makes 
possible a long sequence of future agreement.”124 Mild trust can grow 
into strong trust.125 Mutual trust can become a self-sustaining virtuous 
cycle.126 
This pattern of trust developing through past cooperation and 
then leading to greater future cooperation is evidenced throughout the 
modern history of price fixing. Past price-fixing activity is an excellent 
predictor of future price fixing because “an industry with a history of 
price fixing is more likely to repeat that behavior again.”127 The first 
attempts at price fixing generally fail, but lessons are learned that make 
the second or third iteration of a cartel much more likely to succeed. In 
their study of cartel duration, Professors Levenstein and Suslow noted 
that “cartels reappear in some industries, and cartel duration tends to 
increase with industry experience with collusion.”128 Cartel experience 
makes each successive iteration of a price-fixing conspiracy more likely 
to succeed as the conspirators grow to trust their coconspirators and 
learn how best to structure and run a stable cartel.129 
Not surprisingly, having a reputation for trustworthiness makes 
one more likely to be trusted, which increases the desire of others to 
enter cooperative ventures.130 One’s perceived trustworthiness is as 
important as one’s actual trustworthiness.131 As a result, “[t]he value of 
 
 124. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 134–35 (1960). 
 125. See Toshio Yamagishi, The Structural Goal/Expectation Theory of Cooperation in Social 
Dilemmas, in 3 ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES 51, 70 (Edward J. Lawler ed., 1986) (“Given 
this conviction of reciprocity or trust in the partner, each actor voluntarily cooperates, and as a 
result each actor’s conviction or trust is substantiated by the cooperation of the partner. This cycle 
leads the dyad to a higher level of mutual trust and mutual cooperation.”). 
 126. James P. Gahagan & James T. Tedeschi, Strategy and the Credibility of Promises in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, 12 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 224, 225 (1968). 
 127. CONNOR, supra note 116, at 526. 
 128. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 100, at 27. 
 129. STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 20, at 143 (discussing Germany’s role in nitrogen 
cartel); see also Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success?, 
44 J. ECON. LIT. 43, 54–55 (2006) (“In some cases, such as the copper cartel, each period of 
cartelization appears to endure for longer than the previous one. This suggests a pattern of 
learning on the part of cartel members.”); Fausto R. Pitigliani, The Development of Italian Cartels 
Under Fascism, 48 J. POL. ECON. 375, 380 (1940) (discussing cartelization of the artificial textiles 
market in fascist Italy). 
 130. Robyn M. Dawes & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Cooperation, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 187, 
190 (“A cooperative act itself—or a reputation for being a cooperative person—may with high 
probability be reciprocated with cooperation, to the ultimate benefit of the cooperator.”). 
 131. See Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, Trusting and Trustworthiness, 81 B.U. L. REV. 
523, 530 (2001) (“The simplest way in which information impacts trusting is through A’s 
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a trustworthy reputation may be so high that it becomes rational to 
resist temptations to seize short-run advantages.”132 In the context of 
price fixing, a firm may rationally forgo the short-term profits that 
could be earned through cheating in order to essentially purchase a 
reputation for being a trustworthy coconspirator.133 Firms can hone 
their reputations for being trustworthy in foreign price-fixing schemes 
and use that reputation to establish their dependability as a cartel 
partner in a conspiracy in the U.S. market. 
Companies can use their foreign cartel experience as a calling card 
to convince potential cartel partners in new product and geographic 
markets that they are trustworthy.134 For example, because pre-World 
War II Germany did not condemn cartelization, German companies 
had developed strong reputations as effective price fixers, which made 
them “natural leaders for international cartels.”135 Germany’s IG 
Farben, in particular, was a cartel-generating machine, participating in 
cartels that manipulated the markets in dyestuffs, film, drugs and 
pharmaceuticals, petroleum and chemical industries, acrylate plastics, 
urea formaldehyde plastics, cellulose plastics, chlorinated rubber, 
magnesium, cyanides, tetraethyl lead, iron carbonyl, alkalies, dyes, 
nitrogen and nitrogenous fertilizers, and sulphuric acid.136 Farben 
eventually had “agreements with every major world chemical 
producer, covering together virtually every branch of chemical 
manufacturing.”137 In short, “IG [Farben] created cartels everywhere it 
went.”138 Even though such price fixing was illegal in the United States, 
Farben harnessed its reputation as a cartel ringleader to convince 
several American chemical companies to enter collusive agreements.139 
Having a successful cartel in a foreign jurisdiction helps rivals establish 
trust and expand their cartel to the United States. 
Finally, the cultivation of a group identity can create trust. 
 
knowledge of B’s reputation.”); see also id. at 531 (“The most important sources of information 
about the trustworthiness of potential trading partners are direct experience and word-of-mouth 
in social networks.”). 
 132. Bernd Lahno, Trust, Reputation, and Exit in Exchange Relationships, 39 J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 495, 509 (1995). 
 133. Leslie, supra note 7, at 596–98. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 597 (citing STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 1, at 30). 
 136. STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 20, at 476–78. 
 137. Id. at 466 (“These agreements, meticulously drafted, have tended to ‘stabilize’ the 
chemical markets.”). 
 138. Id. at 480. 
 139. Leslie, supra note 19, at 597 (citing STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 20, at 474). 
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Members of a perceived group show a sense of loyalty and may 
sacrifice their short-term interests in order to advance the group’s long-
term interests.140 When individuals share a sense of group identity, they 
are more likely to cooperate with each other, as group members 
perceive each other as being relatively trustworthy.141 
Cartel members often form a group identity that helps stabilize the 
cartel relationship.142 They can originate and refine this group identity 
in foreign jurisdictions and then use the trust it creates to expand their 
price fixing into the United States. By agreeing to violate competition 
laws, price-fixing firms create a mutual dependence and shared secret 
among the group members.143 The discussions among the competitors 
to create the cartel and negotiate its terms can lead to the formation of 
a group identity.144 The back and forth of negotiations can lead 
individuals to feel a group dynamic that leads to a shared collective 
identity.145 Over time, successful cartels form social norms, which can 
help reinforce many necessary aspects of the cartel arrangement and 
allow it to expand geographically.146 Cartels have developed many 
insidious norms. For example, the electrical equipment cartel of the 
1950s and 1960s developed a social norm of members concealing their 
price fixing,147 and the magnesium cartel “cultivat[ed] a philosophy of 
restrictionism.”148 Ultimately, these social norms can convince cartel 
 
 140. Id. at 584–90. 
 141. David Sally, Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 7 RATIONALITY & 
SOC’Y 58, 68 (1995). 
 142. Leslie, supra note 19, at 584–90. 
 143. Even in nations with relatively weak competition laws or enforcement regimes, firms 
generally try to conceal their price-fixing activities from competition authorities. 
 144. See Robyn M. Dawes, Alphons J. C. van de Kragt & John M. Orbell, Cooperation for the 
Benefit of Us—Not Me, or My Conscience, in BEYOND SELF INTEREST 97, 99 (Jane J. Mansbridge 
ed., 1990) (“Our experiments have led us to conclude that cooperation rates can be radically 
affected by one factor in particular, which is independent of the consequences for the choosing 
individual. That factor is group identity.”). 
 145. Jane J. Mansbridge, The Rise and Fall of Self-Interest in the Explanation of Political Life, 
in BEYOND SELF INTEREST, supra note 144, at 3, 17 (“Experimenters can raise the level of 
cooperative behavior to 85 percent by allowing discussion and other procedures that increase 
feelings of group identity.”). 
 146. Leslie, supra note 19, at 586–87. 
 147. JOHN HERLING, THE GREAT PRICE CONSPIRACY: THE STORY OF THE ANTITRUST 
VIOLATIONS IN THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY 50 (1962) (“Under questioning by Senator Hart, 
Paxton admitted that he would have promptly reported the stealing of company property or 
embezzlement of company funds by anybody, even if he were not in his direct line of command. 
But to report the violation of the antitrust law would have broken his own code, and what is more, 
would have exposed him to the danger of acquiring a reputation as a ‘troublemaker.’”). 
 148. STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 20, at 303. 
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participants that price fixing is perfectly acceptable.149 Indeed, abiding 
by one’s cartel commitments can be seen by participants to rise to the 
level of an “ethical” obligation.150 Once these norms of trust and 
collusive cooperation are established in one geographic market, they 
can be exploited to expand the cartel to new geographic markets. In 
the world of business, a price-fixing cartel may be the ultimate group 
with a shared identity. 
In sum, successful cartelization in another market may mean that 
the competing firms have used their experience to create the necessary 
relationships to solve the trust juggernaut. Trust is an asset that cartel 
members can produce and expand. They can produce trust in foreign 
jurisdictions and use that trust to expand the cartel into the United 
States. 
2. Foreign Conspiracies and Coordination Problems.  In an 
international industry, the presence of a cartel outside the United 
States also demonstrates that the industry leaders have overcome the 
coordination problems that may otherwise hinder a price-fixing 
conspiracy in the United States. Launching an international cartel 
requires significant coordination among rival firms that come from 
different corporate cultures, often speak different languages, and may 
be generally reluctant to cooperate with their competitors. Yet to form 
a successful cartel, the coconspirators must coordinate the level and the 
timing of price increases, as well as in some cases, the volume of 
production, market allocation, and the announcement of price 
increases. Disputes during the initial and ongoing negotiations about 
these cartel terms and operating procedures can destabilize the 
arrangement, especially when cartel members perceive that their 
partners are bargaining in bad faith.151 When disagreements lead to 
misunderstandings about the precise cartel terms, distrust may ensue; 
this can cause a cartel to unravel into competition.152 
Beginning a cartel by fixing price in a relatively small market 
affords the cartel members an opportunity to address and solve these 
 
 149. Leslie, supra note 19, at 588–90. 
 150. STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 20, at 395 (discussing historical chemical cartels); see 
also FULLER, supra note 33, at 58 (explaining that firms fixing prices in the electrical equipment 
markets “had rationalized their machinations to the point where they now believed that their 
actions were not wrong, that they were above the laws which applied to everyone else. . . . The 
individuals themselves faced a slow corrosion of values.”). 
 151. KURT EICHENWALD, THE INFORMANT 201 (2000) (discussing lysine cartel). 
 152. See id. at 200. 
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coordination problems on a manageable scale. After the cartel partners 
develop a stable working relationship in running a small-market cartel, 
they can expand their price fixing into new product and geographic 
markets. For example, the aluminum cartel gave birth to the 
magnesium cartel.153 Similarly, the member firms of the international 
cyanide cartel first constrained trade in sodium cyanide, hydrogen 
cyanide, and hydrocyanic acid, among others, before moving to expand 
their cartel activities to other chemicals.154 In the 1950s and 1960s, 
major American electrical equipment manufacturers grew to cartelize 
dozens of individual product markets as “[t]he experience of one 
conspiracy was often transferred to another.”155 The multibillion dollar 
international vitamins cartel began by fixing the prices of relatively few 
vitamins and then expanding to other vitamins as the manufacturers 
gained experience in price fixing.156 The experience of the international 
vitamin cartel led some members to expand their price fixing activities 
to include the international markets for other products, including citric 
acid,157 lysine,158 and MSG.159 This dynamic is common throughout the 
history of price fixing.160 
Price-fixing conspiracies often involve fits and starts. Professors 
Levenstein and Suslow note that “one of the most clearly established 
patterns is that cartels form, endure for a period, appear to break down, 
and then re-form again.”161 This pattern can be witnessed in numerous 
historical international cartels, including those in steel,162 sugar,163 and 
explosives,164 among others. American history shows this same pattern 
 
 153. STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 20, at 274. 
 154. See id. at 489–90. 
 155. HERLING, supra note 147, at 89; see also Leslie, supra note 7, at 591–96 (discussing other 
examples of cartel creep). 
 156. CONNOR, supra note 116, at 310. 
 157. Id. at 277 (“Memoranda have come to light that show the citric acid cartel was joined in 
1991 by Hoffman-La Roche explicitly because of its profitable prior experience in vitamins.”). 
 158. Id. at 426. 
 159. EICHENWALD, supra note 151, at 164. 
 160. STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 20, at 199 (“Before 1938, collaboration between the 
Export Association and the [international] steel cartel was limited to price and quota agreements 
with three of the cartel’s selling syndicates. These agreements covered exports of tin plate, rails, 
and tubular products. Experience in these fields proving mutually satisfactory, the cartel . . . 
[broadened] collaboration.”). 
 161. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 100, at 14. 
 162. STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 20, at 186. 
 163. William Notz, International Private Agreements in the Form of Cartels, Syndicates, and 
Other Combinations, 28 J. POL. ECON. 658, 676 (1920). 
 164. STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 20, at 442–43. 
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in domestic cartels, such as the early railroad cartel, the 1880s whiskey 
cartel,165 and the 1980s school milk cartel.166 For multinational 
corporations with designs on creating a stable international cartel, it 
makes more sense to address and resolve the inevitable problems of 
cartel creation in a foreign jurisdiction with less severe antitrust 
penalties. After the growing pains have dissipated, the cartel can 
expand into the more lucrative American market. 
3. Foreign Conspiracies and Cartel Enforcement.  Cartel activity 
outside the United States also allows for creating, refining, and 
perfecting cartel enforcement mechanisms that can then be employed 
in a price-fixing conspiracy in the United States. Cartel enforcement 
schemes generally serve two functions: detect cheating and punish 
defectors.167 Traditional monitoring devices to detect cartel cheating 
include the reporting of sales figures by cartel members, as well as 
employing auditors, independent administrators, and spies.168 
Common punishment mechanisms include imposing fines and 
requiring firms that sell more than their quota to purchase products 
from their cartel partners who sold less than their cartel allotment.169 
Developing an effective cartel enforcement regime takes significant 
time and effort. 
Foreign price-fixing activity can signify that the firms in the 
industry have developed an efficient enforcement mechanism that 
combines the necessary functions of detecting and punishing cheating 
on the cartel. Once a cartel has sufficient experience in one or more 
geographic markets, it can more easily expand into new regions. After 
the cartel has mastered its operations in a weak-antitrust jurisdiction, 
it can expand into more risky territories, like the United States. 
4. Summary.  In short, successful cartels beget more cartels. A first 
cartel can be difficult to form. A second cartel can be significantly 
easier to establish. Trust has already been established. The parties are 
aware that cooperation is possible and can significantly increase their 
profits. The parties have developed reliable enforcement mechanisms. 
If the major firms in an industry are fixing prices in one market, this 
 
 165. JEREMIAH JENKS, THE TRUST PROBLEM 147 (1917). 
 166. Robert F. Lanzillotti, The Great School Milk Conspiracies of the 1980s, 11 REV. INDUS. 
ORG. 413, 444 (1996). 
 167. Leslie, supra note 19, at 610–22. 
 168. Id. at 612–15. 
 169. Id. at 612–21. 
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increases the likelihood that the same firms are engaging in price fixing 
in another market. This heightened probability makes the fact of 
foreign price fixing a probative plus factor in litigation alleging a 
domestic conspiracy. 
C. Foreign Conspiracies and the Motive To Fix Prices in the United 
States 
The primary reason for a cartel operating in a foreign market to 
expand its price fixing into the American market is the same 
motivation for fixing prices anywhere: profits. Price fixing is lucrative. 
As the largest economy in the world, the American marketplace is an 
attractive target for price fixers. Being relatively wealthy, American 
consumers may be more willing and better able to pay 
supracompetitive prices. The lure of cartel profits will always make 
price fixing seem tempting.170 This motivation is not unique to firms 
that are already fixing prices in foreign jurisdictions. 
Beyond the general temptation of cartel profits, the participation 
of defendant firms, or their parent or sister corporations, in a price-
fixing cartel outside of the United States provides several additional 
motives for the firms to fix prices in the American market as well. If a 
cartel has successfully raised prices in foreign markets, it may need to 
raise price similarly in the American market in order to prevent 
significant price disparities across markets. Such price differences can 
cause several problems for the cartel. First, price disparities create the 
risk of arbitrage. If the prices are lower in the American marketplace 
than in other markets, interlopers may engage in arbitrage, by 
purchasing products at competitive prices in the United States and 
reselling them in cartelized markets at supracompetitive prices that are 
nonetheless below the cartel price.171 This arbitrage can dramatically 
 
 170. Despite the penalties associated with violating American antitrust law, we know that 
hundreds of firms accept the attendant risks and engage in criminal price fixing. 
 171. Grant Butler, The Supreme Court’s Destruction of Incentive to Participate in the Justice 
Department’s Cartel Leniency Program, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 169, 180 (2005) (“If a cartel chose 
to fix prices only in foreign countries, arbitrageurs can purchase the goods in the United States at 
the competitive market price and take them to a foreign country where the goods could be sold 
at a price higher than the competitive price but lower than the fixed price of the cartel.”). 
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reduce the cartel’s profits172 and could destabilize the entire cartel.173 
To reduce the risk of arbitrage, regional cartels will often expand 
their operations internationally, for example to include the United 
States.174 In international cartels, cartel managers set regional prices in 
relation to each other in order to prevent arbitrage across foreign and 
American markets.175 Once a cartel has significantly elevated prices in 
the Canadian, European, or other foreign markets, the cartel 
leadership has a strong incentive to ensure that the price in the 
American market is similarly high.176 Expanding a foreign cartel to 
American soil not only generates new illegal profits from the U.S. sales, 
it also protects the cartel’s price margins in foreign markets. 
 
 172. Id. (“Arbitrage can therefore ruin the market power gained by the cartel’s price fixing 
behavior.”). The cartel may respond to this threat by engaging in limit pricing, which entails the 
cartel leadership trying to set a price that is higher than the competitive price but not so high as 
to induce new entry into the market. Phototron Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 842 F.2d 95, 101 
(5th Cir. 1988) (explaining limit pricing means setting “price at a level just below that which a 
prospective entrant to the market would need to charge in order to sustain a successful entry”). 
While limit pricing can reduce new entrants and arbitrage activity, limit pricing necessarily 
reduces the cartel’s profit below what would be secured in the absence of arbitrage threats. 
 173. John M. Connor & Darren Bush, How To Block Cartel Formation and Price Fixing: 
Using Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws as a Deterrence Mechanism, 112 PENN ST. 
L. REV. 813, 835 (2008) (“Arbitrage undermines the ability of international cartels to set prices at 
the most profitable level in each currency zone and could even destroy collusive arrangements.”). 
 174. See Butler, supra note 171, at 180 (“Price fixing cartels selling global goods must operate 
in all markets to avoid arbitrage.”); Christopher Sprigman, Fix Prices Globally, Get Sued Locally? 
U.S. Jurisdiction over International Cartels, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 265, 275 (2005) (“Accordingly, the 
vitamin conspirators were obliged to cartelize globally: that is, to bring into the cartel enough of 
the worldwide supply that the supracompetitive price is defensible against arbitrage.”). 
 175. Connor & Bush, supra note 173, at 835 (“But the only way cartelists can effectively 
prevent geographic arbitrage is to make it unprofitable by frequently resetting domestic cartel 
prices in all regions of the world using current exchange rates to ensure that prices remain close 
together.”); see also In re Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust Litig., 681 F. 
Supp. 2d 141, 160 (D. Conn. 2009) (“[T]he plaintiffs contend that conduct in Europe is important 
for understanding the U.S. price-fixing scheme because EPDM manufacturers set U.S. prices in 
consideration of European prices to avoid the potential for arbitrage and the defendants’ North 
American and European counterparts met to discuss EPDM pricing and customers in both 
markets.”). 
 176. Jonathan T. Schmidt, Note, Keeping U.S. Courts Open to Foreign Antitrust Plaintiffs: A 
Hybrid Approach to the Effective Deterrence of International Cartels, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 211, 220 
(2006) (“If the cartel’s product is sold in the United States, the cartel must raise its price in the 
United States sufficiently so that it is not profitable to buy the product in the United States, ship 
it to another market, and sell it at or below the cartel price.”); see also In re Monosodium 
Glutamate, No. CIV.00MDL1328, 2005 WL 2810682, at *1 (D. Minn. Oct. 26, 2005) (“Defendants 
allegedly included the United States in the cartel precisely to extract cartel profits from purchasers 
around the world without risk of arbitrage.”), aff’d sub nom., In re Monosodium Glutamate 
Antitrust Litig., 477 F.3d 535 (8th Cir. 2007) (affirming the lower court’s dismissal of the 
complaint). 
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Second, even without arbitrage, if foreign markets have cartel-
inflated prices while the American market reflects a lower competitive 
price, buyers in the non-American market may switch to American 
suppliers that are charging lower prices. American sellers can price 
discipline a non-American cartel.177 In order to reduce or prevent this 
possibility, the cartel has every incentive to raise the price in the United 
States. The most straightforward mechanism for doing so may be to 
expand their price-fixing operations into the American market. In his 
deposition testimony, one coconspirator in an alleged graphite 
products cartel testified “that a conspiracy to fix prices in Europe must 
necessarily involve the fixing of prices in other markets, including the 
United States.”178 Otherwise consumers would evade the fixed price by 
purchasing in the cheaper market.179 
Third, if a foreign cartel does not expand into the American 
market, this increases the risk of exposure to foreign competition 
authorities. Foreign price fixing may be more obvious if there is a huge 
price disparity between U.S. and foreign prices. Lockstep price 
increases among rival companies are often strong circumstantial 
evidence of an underlying agreement to raise prices. Antitrust 
defendants often attempt to explain their uniform price increases as a 
product of increases in input costs.180 This common explanation may 
lose its persuasive power if the American market is not experiencing a 
similar increase in price. Thus, the fear of cartel exposure may 
 
 177. The ability of consumers to switch to American suppliers will be a function of several 
factors, including tariffs, transportation costs, and the nature of the product. For example, if tariffs 
or transportation costs are particularly high, this provides a price umbrella for foreign cartels.  
If the competitive price for a product in the United States and the European common 
market is $10 per unit, but tariffs and transportation costs make the real price of an American-
sourced version of the product for European consumers rise to $14 per unit, then a European 
cartel could raise the price of the product forty percent, from $10 to $14 per unit, without losing 
any sales to American suppliers. 
 178. In re Bulk (Extruded) Graphite Prods., No. CIV. 02-6030, 2007 WL 2212713, at *9 
(D.N.J. July 30, 2007). 
 179. Id. at *8 (explaining the need for extending a European-based cartel into the American 
market, a coconspirator in an alleged graphite products cartel stated that “[t]he issue of graphite 
electrodes is if you sold them one place for one price and another place for another price, 
somebody would go to the other place that was a cheaper price”). 
 180. See, e.g., Suwannee Am. Cement LLC v. Zurich Ins. Co., 885 F. Supp. 2d 611, 613 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting plaintiffs’ allegation that “[d]efendants repeatedly attributed dramatic 
price increases to rising fuel and input costs, when in fact these costs did not justify the price 
increases”); In re Refrigerant Compressors Antitrust Litig., 795 F. Supp. 2d 647, 663 (E.D. Mich. 
2011) (“Defendants represented that their pricing activities were unilateral, rather than collusive, 
and were based on market conditions and legitimate business purposes, such as increased input 
costs . . . .”). 
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encourage a non-American cartel to fix prices in the U.S. marketplace 
in order to reduce price disparities across markets that foreign antitrust 
officials may see as a telltale sign of price fixing. 
Beyond the myriad problems that price disparities across 
geographic markets can create for a cartel, the members of a foreign 
cartel may wish to expand their price-fixing operations into the U.S. 
market in order to stabilize the cartel. If the members of a price-fixing 
conspiracy collude in some major markets but compete in others, it 
increases the risk of miscommunication or misunderstandings, both of 
which can disrupt cartels.181 Competition in the free market could spill 
over into the cartelized one. For example, a firm’s nonproscribed 
aggression in the competitive market, which is not covered by the cartel 
agreement, could be misinterpreted as cheating on the cartel. This 
could induce a defensive price reduction, which starts a more 
generalized price war. Cartels can minimize this risk by having their 
cartel agreement cover all of the geographic markets in which they 
operate, including the United States. 
Finally, expanding a foreign price-fixing conspiracy into the 
United States may strengthen the overall cartel by increasing the value 
of the cartel to all of its members. An international cartel generates 
significantly more ill-gotten gains than a more localized cartel. 
Cheating in just one geographic market in which an international cartel 
operates, though, risks destabilizing the entire cartel worldwide. This 
substantially increases the expected costs of cheating on the cartel in 
any region and, thereby creates a stronger incentive to abide by the 
cartel agreement globally. As cartel expert Corwin Edwards explained 
over half a century ago, firms that compete in multiple geographic 
markets, “may hesitate to fight local wars vigorously because the 
prospects of local gain are not worth the risk of general warfare.”182 
Thus, increasing the geographic breadth of a cartel reduces each firm’s 
incentive to cheat in any individual geographic market. An 
international cartel makes a domestic cartel more stable and 
effective.183 Because an American cartel may be used to stabilize 
foreign price-fixing agreements, the existence of the latter may be 
 
 181. See, e.g., Joel M. Podolny & Fiona M. Scott Morton, Social Status, Entry and Predation: 
The Case of British Shipping Cartels 1879-1929, 47 J. INDUS. ECON. 41, 45 n.4 (1999). 
 182. F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
340 (1980) (2d ed 1980) (alteration in original) (quoting Corwin Edwards). 
 183. See Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 403 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting argument 
that “the success of an anticompetitive scheme in foreign markets may enhance the effectiveness 
of an anticompetitive scheme in the domestic market”). 
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evidence of motive to establish the former. 
For all of the above reasons, foreign price fixing is often correlated 
with domestic price fixing. Because cartels are often international in 
scope, covering the entire world market, the existence of a foreign 
cartel often indicates a larger global cartel that includes the U.S. 
market.184 
IV.  THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF FOREIGN PRICE FIXING 
Whereas Part III presented the practical significance of foreign 
price-fixing operations and their relationship to price fixing in the 
American marketplace, this Part considers the legal significance. First, 
it examines why price-fixing activity abroad satisfies the standard 
criteria for being a plus factor. Second, it analyzes those federal and 
state court opinions that have held that defendants’ foreign price-fixing 
conduct is not a plus factor and explains why those opinions are flawed. 
Finally, it explores the consequences of those incorrect decisions. 
A. Price Fixing Outside the United States as a Plus Factor 
Although some courts have recognized the probative value of 
foreign price-fixing conspiracies to the determination of whether 
defendants agreed to fix prices in the United States,185 most courts have 
not.186 The judicial opinions that have minimized the significance of 
foreign price-fixing conspiracies have not held merely that such 
conspiracies are neither proof nor direct evidence of such an 
agreement. Rather, these courts have held that the existence of a 
 
 184. Regardless of where an international cartel began its operations, foreign price fixing is 
indicative of domestic price fixing. The fact that these defendant multinational corporations 
solved the operational problems of running a cartel in a foreign jurisdiction means that they are 
more likely to have solved these problems for an American-targeted cartel. The alleged cartel in 
the United States can be a follow-on cartel from a foreign price-fixing cartel. Alternatively, in 
theory, the presence of foreign price fixing can be evidence that the defendants started their price 
fixing in the United States and expanded it into foreign jurisdictions. Either way, the presence of 
the foreign cartel is consistent with—and evidence of—a price-fixing conspiracy in the United 
States. It makes more sense, however, that a price-fixing conspiracy would begin abroad and 
migrate into the U.S. market. Jurisdictions with relatively weak competition laws are more likely 
to be incubators for nascent cartels. 
 185. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., No. 1426, 2004 WL 7200711, at *3 (E.D. 
Pa. Oct. 29, 2004) (“Evidence of cooperation between Defendants in foreign price-fixing, through 
a trade association or otherwise, would certainly be relevant to establish the existence of an illegal 
combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade, which is a required element of a § 1 Sherman Act 
claim.”). 
 186. See supra Part II. 
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foreign price-fixing conspiracy is not a plus factor—that is, not relevant 
circumstantial evidence—as a matter of law.187 The fact that the 
defendant firms are fixing prices in a foreign jurisdiction, or have done 
so recently, is a plus factor. When coupled with other plus factors, 
foreign price-fixing conspiracies can provide an important part of the 
circumstantial evidence that proves the defendants have agreed to fix 
prices in the United States in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
Evidence of the defendants’ participation in foreign price fixing 
bears the hallmarks of a strong plus factor. Plus factors are simply 
circumstances “that increase the likelihood that the parallel prices 
resulted from conspiracy.”188 If the defendants are colluding in other 
markets, this demonstrates that they have solved the trust juggernaut 
that prevents many price-fixing cartels from forming or surviving. It 
also shows that they have surmounted the operational problems that 
generally plague cartels. Despite these insights, the Eleventh Circuit in 
Williamson was not persuaded by the plaintiffs’ expert testimony that 
“the foreign agreements provided a mechanism to ‘establish and revise, 
and to monitor and enforce agreements to coordinate.’”189 This shows 
a judicial failure to appreciate how cartels operate. 
When the defendants have fixed prices in foreign markets, the 
alleged U.S. cartel is but one part of a larger international cartel. 
Although such global cartels are common, international cartels rarely 
start off as international cartels; they usually start as national or 
regional cartels and then grow as the price fixers learn to trust each 
other. When experimenting with a “starter cartel,” it makes little sense 
to start in the United States. American antitrust law treats price fixers 
more harshly than the competition laws of other jurisdictions. Price 
fixing is a criminal offense in the United States, and price fixers can be 
imprisoned for up to ten years.190 Criminal fines can be double the 
cartel’s gain with the result exceeding $1 billion.191 Civil damages are 
also greater in the United States, as successful plaintiffs are entitled to 
 
 187. Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1312 n.46 
(N.D. Ga. 2002) (“Plaintiffs’ allegations of foreign market conspiracies are not probative of 
collusion as a matter of law.”), aff’d sub nom., Williamson Oil Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 
F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 188. Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1043 (8th Cir. 
2000) (Gibson, J., dissenting). 
 189. Williamson Oil Co., 346 F.3d at 1317. 
 190. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 191. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2012). 
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mandatory treble damages.192 Furthermore, class action litigation 
allows victims of price-fixing schemes to aggregate their claims.193 
Although the size of the American marketplace means that cartels can 
generate significant ill-gotten gains by fixing the prices charged to 
American consumers, the risk and consequences of antitrust liability 
mean that smart price fixers will perfect their price-fixing conspiracy in 
other jurisdictions before moving into the U.S. market.194 Using a 
foreign market to perfect the cartel’s methods of enforcement and 
concealment before fixing price in the United States makes sense. 
Evidence of foreign price fixing is thus inherently probative when the 
plaintiff’s theory of the case involves allegations that the alleged price-
fixing activity in the United States is part of a larger international 
cartel.195 
Not only is the existence of a foreign price-fixing conspiracy a 
relevant plus factor unto itself, it is also a combination of several well-
established plus factors. First, for example, motive to conspire is a plus 
factor.196 The fact that the defendants’ foreign units have fixed prices 
indicates a motive for defendants to fix prices in the American 
market.197 As discussed above, a foreign cartel’s failure to elevate 
prices across regional markets, including the United States, can create 
 
 192. 15 U.S.C. § 15. 
 193. Changes in American arbitration jurisprudence, however, may make antitrust class 
actions considerably harder in the future. See Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust 
Arbitration and Merger Approval, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 37–38 (2015); Christopher R. Leslie, The 
Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 275–77 (2015). 
 194. Cartel expansion into the United States is not inevitable, however. Foreign cartels may 
decide against carrying their activities across the U.S. border because the penalties for price fixing 
are relatively high in the United States. These penalties include the risk of imprisonment, which 
is a strong deterrent. Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. for Criminal Enf’t, 
Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Charting New Waters in International Cartel Prosecution 
(Mar. 2, 2006), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518446/download [https://perma.cc/P3EV-DGR6] 
(“We have uncovered international cartels that operated profitably and illegally in Europe, Asia, 
and elsewhere around the world, but did not expand their collusion to the United States solely 
because the executives decided it was not worth the risk of going to jail.”). As foreign jurisdictions 
provide for imprisonment for price fixing, this dynamic may change and foreign price fixers may 
be more willing to expand into the U.S. market as the relative severity of American antitrust law 
decreases. 
 195. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., No. 1426, 2004 WL 7200711, at *4 (E.D. 
Pa. Oct. 29, 2004) (“[E]vidence of foreign price-fixing activities is relevant in determining the 
nature and scope of an alleged international conspiracy.”). 
 196. See LESLIE, supra note 24, at 26. 
 197. The motive to fix prices with one’s competitors should be self-evident. Participation in a 
cartel allows a firm to reduce output and increase price in order to maximize each firm’s profits. 
But the presence of foreign price fixing greatly magnifies the defendants’ incentives to fix prices 
in the American market. See supra Part III.C. 
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price disparities. These disparities create the risk of arbitrage, of losing 
sales to American sellers, and of exposure to foreign competition law 
authorities. Furthermore, expanding the cartel’s price-fixing activities 
into the U.S. market helps conceal their foreign price-fixing activities 
and can help stabilize an international cartel. These are powerful 
incentives for foreign price fixers to extend their conspiracy onto 
American soil. 
Courts, however, often fail to comprehend these motives. For 
example, federal courts do not seem to recognize the risk of arbitrage 
as a strong incentive for foreign cartels to manipulate prices in the 
American market.198 Similarly, as noted above, when a cartel covers 
several regions, cheating in any one market could destabilize the entire 
cartel and cause the cheater to sacrifice its cartel profits across the 
globe.199 Courts emphatically do not understand this dynamic. For 
example, in Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc.,200 the 
district judge rejected the plaintiffs’ expert testimony “that ‘multi-
market contact facilitates a conspiracy in the United States because it 
decreases the likelihood that competitors will, for example, violate the 
agreement in the United States for fear of endangering anticompetitive 
agreements in other countries.’”201 The court held that the “Plaintiffs’ 
allegations of foreign market conspiracies are not probative of 
collusion as a matter of law,”202 but the evidence is probative for 
precisely the reason provided by the plaintiffs’ economist.203 
 
 198. See, e.g., In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 999 F. Supp. 2d 777, 784 (M.D. 
Pa. 2014). 
 199. See Smith v. Philip Morris Cos., 335 P.3d 644, 673 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015) (noting, although 
the court ultimately rejected this argument, plaintiffs’ contention “that when competitors collude 
in several foreign markets, if one conspirator ‘jumps ship’ in one particular market, that 
conspirator’s position in another market where the conspirators’ enjoy inflated prices may be 
placed in jeopardy”). 
 200. Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (N.D. Ga. 
2002), aff’d sub nom., Williamson Oil Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 
2003). 
 201. Id. at 1312 n.46 (quoting Plaintiffs’ Response at 58, Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co., 231 
F. Supp. 2d 1253 (No. 1:00-CV-0447-JOF)). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Yet some courts unequivocally deny this chain of logic. For example, in one of many 
tobacco cartel cases in which courts rejected foreign price fixing as a plus factor for showing 
similar price fixing in the American market, the Kansas appellate court held “[d]omestic conduct 
that is alleged to have furthered a conspiracy to fix prices in some foreign market is not relevant 
in this case.” Smith, 335 P.3d at 673–74; see also id. at 673 (“This theory, of course, provides no 
support for the notion that the claimed foreign price-fixing conspiracy provides evidence from 
which one can infer an agreement to fix prices in Kansas.”). 
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Second, communications among the defendants is a plus factor.204 
Because the defendants in an alleged horizontal price-fixing conspiracy 
are competitors in the market, communications among them are 
suspicious. Foreign price-fixing activities will often reveal actual 
communications involving sellers in the American market. These 
communications to and from members of the foreign cartel may be 
consistent with, or evidence of, price fixing in the United States. 
Third, showing that the defendants had the opportunity to 
conspire is an important plus factor.205 Foreign price-fixing activity can 
establish that the defendants had occasions to discuss not only their 
foreign pricing but also the profitability and prospects of including the 
American market in their price-fixing operations. Some courts have 
recognized the relevance of the defendants’ foreign price fixing to an 
alleged American conspiracy.206 But too many courts miss the 
significance.207 
Fourth, evidence that the market structure in which the defendant 
firms operate is conducive to collusion is an important plus factor.208 
For example, the Seventh Circuit has explained that “an industry 
structure that facilitates collusion constitutes supporting evidence of 
collusion.”209 If the defendants have engaged in price fixing in foreign 
markets, then this suggests the market structure for the product at issue 
fosters collusion because it shows, among other things, that the product 
involved is subject to cartelization, that the product has few economic 
substitutes, and that there are likely to be barriers to entry. All of these 
 
 204. See LESLIE, supra note 24, at 26; see also William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie 
M. Marx & Halbert L. White, Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 
393, 408 (2011) (“Perhaps the most probative proof of the mechanism for achieving consensus 
would consist of evidence demonstrating that a pattern of extensive communication among the 
defendants preceded a complex, parallel adjustment in behavior that could not readily be 
explained as the product of the defendants’ independent efforts . . . .”). 
 205. Weit v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 641 F.2d 457, 462 (7th Cir. 1980) (concluding 
that “opportunity to conspire” is relevant “circumstantial evidence . . . to support a finding of a 
price-fixing conspiracy”). 
 206. See In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., No. 1426, 2004 WL 7200711, at *3 (E.D. 
Pa. Oct. 29, 2004) (“Evidence of foreign price-fixing among Defendants would also be material 
to prove that they had the opportunity . . . to engage in domestic price-fixing . . . .”). 
 207. See infra Part IV.B.  
 208. Stanislaus Food Prod. Co. v. USS-POSCO Indus., No. 1:09-CV-00560, 2013 WL 595122, 
at *11 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2013) (“Examples of plus factors include evidence of a market structure 
that is conducive to collusion. . . .”), aff’d, 803 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2015); see also In re Flat Glass 
Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 361 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting plus factor that “the flat glass industry is 
in many respects a text book example of an industry susceptible to efforts to maintain 
supracompetitive prices”). 
 209. In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 627–28 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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variables help satisfy the market structure plus factor.210 Not 
surprisingly then, some courts have recognized that foreign price fixing 
demonstrates that the product market at issue is susceptible to 
cartelization.211 Of course, it is possible that the American market for 
that product may be structurally distinguishable from foreign 
markets.212 If so, defendants should bear the burden to explain how the 
foreign markets differ from the American market and why any 
differences are legally significant.213 As a prima facie matter, however, 
unrebutted evidence of foreign price fixing is a plus factor because it 
shows that the industry structure promotes collusion.214 
In sum, not only is foreign price fixing itself a plus factor, it may 
also be proof of several recognized plus factors. To suggest that the 
defendants’ foreign price-fixing activities have no probative value to 
the determination of whether the defendants agreed to fix prices in the 
American market entails a misunderstanding of plus-factor analysis 
and of how cartels operate. 
B. How Courts Mishandle Evidence of Foreign Conspiracies 
In their evaluation of whether defendants’ foreign price fixing is a 
plus factor, courts have made fundamental mistakes, some factual and 
some legal. Factually, courts fail to understand how cartels operate and 
 
 210. In re Publ’n Paper Antitrust Litig., No. 3:04MD1631, 2010 WL 5253364, at *11 (D. Conn. 
Dec. 14, 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part 690 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2012). The U.S. District Court for 
the District of Connecticut identified the following relevant variables: 
A market is more susceptible to illegal collusion where the market: (1) involves a 
commodity-like product; (2) for which there are few economic substitutes; (3) has a 
limited number of sellers; (4) has barriers to market entry; (5) reflects a lack of 
concentration on the buying side; (6) has sellers that set a ‘national price’; and (7) 
exhibits excess capacity. 
Id. (citing In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 656–58 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
 211. See In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., No. 1426, 2004 WL 7200711, at *3 (E.D. 
Pa. Oct. 29, 2004) (“Evidence of foreign price-fixing among Defendants would also be material 
to prove that they had the . . . ability to engage in domestic price-fixing for automotive refinishing 
paint.”). 
 212. It is possible that foreign markets may have unique barriers to entry that facilitate 
cartelization. 
 213. 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 146 (2d ed. 2003) (“Contemporaneous 
conspiracies in adjacent geographic markets could reasonably be deemed sufficient to transfer to 
the defendants at least the burden of going forward with evidence of an explanation that 
performance is different in the second market . . . .”). 
 214. Cf. In re Plasma-Derivative Protein Therapies Antitrust Litig., 764 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1001 
(N.D. Ill. 2011) (“But the structure of an industry can suggest whether observed parallel behavior 
is likely to be the result of agreement or mere interdependence.”). 
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expand. In applying the law, courts have failed to appreciate the 
process by which plus factors are used to create a circumstantial case 
for inferring an agreement to fix prices. This Section discusses these 
errors. 
1. Legality as Irrelevant.  Several courts have held that foreign 
price-fixing conspiracies cannot be a plus factor unless those 
conspiracies violated foreign law.215 The Williamson court created this 
rule from whole cloth, and other courts have followed.216 These 
holdings are fatally flawed for several reasons. First, illegality is not a 
characteristic of plus factors. Plus factors are not about impropriety; 
they are simply pieces of circumstantial evidence that, when 
aggregated, allow a reasonable inference of the fact of an agreement. 
None of the major plus factors that courts have developed consider 
illicitness. For example, traditional plus factors include motive, 
opportunity, and market structure. None of these classic plus factors 
involves illegality. It is not illegal to have a motive to conspire with 
one’s competitors; it is not illegal to have an opportunity to conspire; 
nor is it illegal to participate in a market whose structure is conducive 
to cartelization. In short, antitrust law has no prerequisite that plus 
factors represent independently illegal conduct. 
Second, illegality is irrelevant to the reasons why foreign price-
fixing activity should be considered an important plus factor. As 
explained above, foreign price fixing may signal domestic antitrust 
violations because it shows motive, opportunity, and a product market 
that is susceptible to cartelization, which are established plus factors. 
In the context of Williamson, regardless of the illegality of foreign price 
fixing, “that the cigarette companies were fixing prices outside the 
United States tends to exclude the possibility that they were acting 
independently in setting prices within the United States.”217 That gives 
foreign price fixing the quintessential characteristic of a plus factor, 
regardless of whether the foreign activity was illegal or not in the 
jurisdiction where it occurred. 
Third, proving the illegality of foreign price fixing unnecessarily 
complicates the antitrust analysis. Under the Eleventh Circuit’s 
 
 215. See supra Part II.A. 
 216. Daniel R. Shulman, Williamson Oil v. Philip Morris: Whatever Happened to Jury Trials?, 
5 SEDONA CONF. J. 81, 89 (2004) (“The [Williamson] Court cited no authority to support this 
result.”). 
 217. Id. 
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approach in Williamson, antitrust plaintiffs would have to prove that 
defendants’ price-fixing activities were illegal in one or more foreign 
jurisdictions. In Williamson itself, this would have required the 
plaintiffs to hire experts to testify that the defendants’ price-fixing 
activities in Saudi Arabia violated Saudi law, that the activities in 
Hungary violated Hungarian law, and so on for ten countries. These 
actions would require the defendants to hire their own cadre of experts 
in foreign antitrust law. American judges, in turn, would have to 
determine which of the dueling experts is more correctly explaining a 
body of law that is literally foreign to American jurists. It can be hard 
to determine with confidence whether and when particular activity 
constitutes illegal price fixing in foreign jurisdictions because some 
foreign countries apply a rule of reason to price fixing, not a per se 
rule.218 Determining the contours of American antitrust law is hard 
enough. Ascertaining the intricacies of non-U.S. competition law is 
problematic, to put it mildly.219 
Some courts bemoan the cost of antitrust litigation and use high 
costs as a justification for pro-defendant rulings.220 Most notably, the 
Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly221 justified increasing 
the plaintiffs’ burden to survive a motion to dismiss by pointing to the 
high expense of antitrust litigation.222 But pro-defendant rulings like 
Williamson unnecessarily drive up the cost further by increasing the 
 
 218. Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1312 (N.D. 
Ga. 2002) (“[T]he jurisdictions in question generally analyzed price-fixing agreements under a 
‘rule of reason’ approach that considered various factors in determining whether such agreements 
were illegal.”), aff’d sub nom., Williamson Oil Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287 (11th 
Cir. 2003). 
 219. When a foreign country’s competition law applies the rule of reason to price-fixing 
agreements, then neither an American nor foreign court can determine whether the activity was 
illegal without knowing the specific facts of the case. While a per se rule against price fixing is 
formalistic and categorical, see Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in 
Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1214 (2008), the rule of reason cannot be applied 
in the abstract. An antitrust plaintiff cannot prove that an agreement violates the rule of reason 
without discovery into the nature and effects of the defendants’ arrangement. 
 220. See, e.g., Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Citigroup, Inc., 709 F.3d 129, 137 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(“If we permit antitrust plaintiffs to overcome a motion to dismiss simply by alleging parallel 
conduct, we risk propelling defendants into expensive antitrust discovery . . . .”); S. Austin Coal. 
Cmty. Council v. SBC Commc’ns Inc., 274 F.3d 1168, 1171 (7th Cir. 2001) (“District courts may 
mitigate the expense of [antitrust] litigation by resolving motions for summary judgment early in 
the case—in advance of discovery, if appropriate, for summary judgment may be sought at any 
time.”). 
 221. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 222. Id. at 558 (raising pleading burdens and noting that “antitrust discovery can be 
expensive”). 
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complexity and duration of discovery. In order to prove one plus factor, 
foreign price-fixing activities, the plaintiffs would need to prove the 
illegality of ten different price-fixing conspiracies under ten different 
bodies of foreign law. The district judge in the Williamson litigation 
lamented that “the court would need to conduct mini-trials on 
Defendants’ conduct in each of the countries at issue” and yet failed to 
recognize that this inefficiency would be a direct result of the court’s 
own (incorrect) ruling that foreign conspiracies must violate foreign 
law in order to be admissible as a plus factor.223 
Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit approach creates a roadmap for 
firms that are intent on creating an international cartel, including the 
U.S. market, to avoid antitrust liability. The first step is to start a cartel 
in some country or countries with lax or no competition laws. 
Historically, during the interwar period in which European 
governments embraced cartels, cartel decisionmakers negotiated their 
agreements in these cartel-lenient countries, and stowed their records 
there in order to keep them out of the hands of American antitrust 
enforcers.224 More recently, the tobacco cartel’s selection of Saudi 
Arabia and Venezuela is particularly telling given that these two 
countries “are generally regarded as the founding fathers” of the 
worldwide petroleum cartel OPEC.225 Perfecting one’s price fixing in a 
relatively safe jurisdiction gives the conspirators an opportunity to 
work out the mechanics of cartel operations and their trust issues.226 
The cartel members can then implement their price-fixing agenda in 
the United States. Under the Williamson rule, not only is the evidence 
of foreign price-fixing activity inadmissible, but the federal court will 
deny discovery into it.227 After the defendants have perfected their 
conspiracy in a foreign jurisdiction, they can expand their price-fixing 
 
 223. Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co., 231 F. Supp. 2d at 1312. 
 224. STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 1, at 270 (“Cartel members generally negotiate their 
agreements in tolerant countries and keep the cartel records there. Hence, even when American 
firms take part in cartels, American public officials charged with antitrust enforcement have 
access to little primary information on cartel structure or operations.”). 
 225. Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, Political Constraints on Government Cartelization: 
The Case of Oil Production Regulation in Texas and Saudi Arabia, in HOW CARTELS ENDURE 
AND HOW THEY FAIL: STUDIES OF INDUSTRIAL COLLUSION, supra note 100, at 196, 207. 
 226. Indeed, the ideal jurisdictions to begin price fixing are those that either do not condemn 
it or have sufficiently weak enforcement regimes that antitrust liability is not a serious risk. In 
these locations, price fixers can focus on the mechanics of negotiating the cartel price—and 
market or customers allocations, if any—without the fear of imprisonment. 
 227. Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co., 231 F. Supp. 2d at 1312 (“Accordingly, the court denied 
Plaintiffs’ motion to conduct foreign discovery.”). 
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campaign into the United States, knowing that their early price-fixing 
efforts cannot be used as evidence against them in American courts. 
2. Connecting the Disconnect.  Several courts have held that 
foreign price fixing cannot be a plus factor unless the plaintiffs can 
prove a sufficiently strong connection between the foreign price-fixing 
activities and the alleged price fixing in the American market. 
Conceptually, the need to show a link sounds reasonable. As applied, 
however, courts often fail to recognize the significance of the 
connections that are present. This Section shows the built-in 
connections between foreign and domestic price-fixing activities. 
 a. The Logical and Corporate Connections.  Defendants’ 
foreign price fixing is a plus factor because the intrinsic nature of cross-
market cartelization provides an inherent connection between foreign 
and domestic price-fixing activities. If defendants have fixed prices in 
foreign markets, they necessarily possess potent reasons to fix price in 
the American markets—to increase their cartel profits, to prevent 
arbitrage and the evasion of the cartel price abroad, to stabilize their 
cartel, and to better conceal their price-fixing in foreign markets.228 
That’s a “palpable link.” If the defendants had managed to create and 
operate a price-fixing cartel outside of the United States, then that too 
is evidence that they are better equipped to do so in the American 
market as well. They have solved the organizational and operational 
problems of launching and maintaining a price-fixing cartel. 
Courts seem to belittle plaintiffs’ evidence of foreign price fixing 
as arguing merely that “if it happened there, it could have happened 
here.”229 This mischaracterizes the context in which plaintiffs proffer 
evidence of defendants’ participation in foreign price fixing. In every 
case discussed in Part II, the plaintiffs had already shown that the 
defendants had engaged in conscious parallel pricing decisions in the 
American market. This context is critical. The inquiry into the 
defendants’ foreign price fixing occurs after parallel pricing is 
established; each side is trying to explain why that identical conduct 
happened. The plaintiffs proffer collusion as the cause of the parallel 
pricing, while the defendants assert independent decisionmaking 
resulted in identical prices. 
The plaintiffs’ theory of collusion is supported by the fact that the 
 
 228. See supra Part III.C. 
 229. See, e.g., In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47, 51–52 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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defendants have already fixed prices in another market. Foreign price 
fixing explains why and how the defendants could have expanded the 
reach of their foreign cartel into the U.S. market.230 If the defendants 
have a benign explanation for the parallel price movements, such as a 
market-wide increase in input costs, defendants can present this 
evidence to rebut the plaintiffs’ circumstantial case. In none of the 
cases in which courts rejected the defendants’ foreign price fixing as a 
plus factor did the courts address why the defendants had increased 
price in lockstep fashion. Of course, the defendant does not bear the 
burden on this issue but given the plaintiffs’ explanation that the 
American price fixing is an extension of a foreign cartel, the courts’ 
failure to credit the plaintiffs’ evidence of collusion is troubling. 
When the defendant corporations, or their parent companies or 
sister subsidiaries, have engaged in price fixing abroad, the corporate 
affiliation necessarily provides a connection between the proven 
foreign cartel and the alleged domestic cartel.231 Multinational 
 
 230. The leading antitrust treatise explains: 
The logical proposition. Imagine that a conspiracy is proved in one of two identical 
markets inhabited by the very same firms. Suppose also that prices, profits, or other 
challenged economic results or business behavior are identical in the two markets. If 
the proved conspiracy is actually necessary to effect the results present in the first 
market—and the defendants must have thought it was, else they would not have 
conspired—then similar results in the second market could not have been achieved 
without a conspiracy there as well. Identity of markets, identity of results, and the 
necessity of conspiracy to these results in one market necessarily prove conspiracy in 
the other market. Furthermore, this proof does not depend upon the two markets in 
question being adjacent in time, geography, or product. A conspiracy in Asia proves a 
conspiracy in Boston when the three stated conditions are satisfied.  
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 213, at 152; see also id. (noting “the difficulties of 
establishing the three conditions”).  
 231. Some courts try to downplay this corporate connection by asserting that two wholly 
owned subsidiaries of the same parent company are “different legal entities.” See, e.g., In re 
Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 403–04 (3d Cir. 2015). While true, this 
detail is irrelevant. The issue is not whether the American defendants are legally responsible for 
their sister subsidiaries’ foreign price-fixing activity, but rather whether the companies are 
connected. Antitrust law explicitly recognizes these connections in other contexts. For example, 
the Supreme Court in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984), held 
that a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary are one entity for the purposes of § 1 of the Sherman 
Act. Copperweld Corp., 467 U.S. at 777. Lower courts have extended the Copperweld doctrine to 
hold that sister corporations—that are each wholly owned subsidiaries of the same parent 
company—should similarly be treated as one entity. Century Oil Tool, Inc. v. Prod. Specialties, 
Inc., 737 F.2d 1316, 1317 (5th Cir. 1984) (observing “no relevant difference between a corporation 
wholly owned by another corporation, two corporations wholly owned by a third corporation or 
two corporations wholly owned by three persons who together manage all affairs of the two 
corporations”); Ass’n of Taxicab Operators, USA v. Yellow Checker Cab Co. of Dallas/Fort 
Worth, 910 F. Supp. 2d 971, 977–78 (N.D. Tex. 2012) (considering sister corporations one entity 
for antitrust purposes and, therefore, unable to illegally conspire with each other); see also 
Livingston Downs Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. Jefferson Downs Corp., 257 F. Supp. 2d 819, 834 (M.D. 
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corporations have corporate cultures, which oftentimes include 
tolerance or encouragement of illegal activity.232 The culture can be 
international in scope233 and specifically embrace price fixing as an 
acceptable norm.234 For example, the rayon cartel created a “culture of 
collusion” that flowed from the fact that many American rayon 
producers started off as subsidiaries of European companies that 
openly cartelized the rayon market.235 Some cartel members feel 
 
La. 2002) (“Two corporations that are wholly owned by the same group of individuals cannot 
conspire with each other.”). 
 Ironically, the federal court in In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litigation held the 
American and Canadian chocolate companies at issue to be unconnected despite the fact that 
“Mars U.S. and Mars Canada both report to the same parent company.” In re Chocolate 
Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 999 F. Supp. 2d 777, 782 (M.D. Pa. 2014). Moreover, “Hershey, 
the parent company, approve[d] all domestic and international pricing decisions” of its American 
and Canadian subsidiaries. Id. It is odd that wholly subsidiaries are considered the same entity for 
Copperweld purposes, but are considered unrelated for plus-factor purposes. 
 232. Sally S. Simpson & Nicole Leeper Piquero, Low Self–Control, Organizational Theory, 
and Corporate Crime, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 509, 535 (2002) (observing phenomenon in which 
“illegal acts become so commonplace or normalized within the corporate culture that insiders 
come to view them as acceptable”); D. Daniel Sokol, Policing the Firm, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
785, 807 (2013) (“Illegal activity may become embedded in an organization over time and become 
a part of organizational culture.”); see also Robert C. Bird, Daniel R. Cahoy & Lucien J. Dhooge, 
Corporate Voluntarism and Liability for Human Rights in A Post-Kiobel World, 102 KY. L.J. 601, 
638 (2014) (“Corporate culture has emerged as a clear source of risk in corporate activity. Human 
rights policies become vitally important as nations begin to consider corporate culture when 
determining corporate criminal accountability.”). 
 233. Sokol, supra note 232, at 824 (discussing “a corporate culture that permitted, and indeed 
encouraged, criminal behavior across different international business units”). 
 234. Id. at 803 (discussing “culture of corruption that allows for [price-fixing] cartels to 
flourish”); see also Arthur Austin, Adam Smith on the Inevitability of Price Fixing, 55 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 501, 508 (2005) (“Price stabilization . . . was DNA at General Electric. As employees 
‘moved up through the corporation ranks, they found that they were inheriting a certain corporate 
“way of life” which had to be accepted, or they were no longer in line for promotion.’” (quoting 
JOHN G. FULLER, THE GENTLEMEN CONSPIRATORS 58 (1962))); John M. Conley & William M. 
O’Barr, Crime and Custom in Corporate Society: A Cultural Perspective on Corporate Misconduct, 
60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 13 (discussing Archer Daniels Midland and noting “[o]rganizing 
a price-fixing conspiracy seems to have been an almost natural development in an autocratic, top-
down corporate culture that prized influence and control above all else”); Christopher Harding 
& Alun Gibbs, Why Go to Court in Europe? An Analysis of Cartel Appeals 1995–2004, 30 EUR. 
L. REV. 349, 369 (2005) (“[T]he awesome level of recidivism on the part of major companies who 
appear as usual suspects in the world of business cartels . . . suggests a confirmed culture of 
business delinquency.”). 
 235. JESSE W. MARKHAM, COMPETITION IN THE RAYON INDUSTRY 97 (1952) (“Many of the 
[rayon] firms that operate in the United States have been loosely associated with each other 
through the European cartel. . . . [They] had worked in harmony with each other in Europe several 
years before American subsidiaries were established.”); id. at 138 (noting “spirit of cooperation” 
in rayon industry as described in a textile trade journal); id. at 78 (“[A]ll [rayon] producers appear 
to have followed a uniform policy on term discounts, shipping terms, booking periods, and price 
guarantees.”); Craig A. Gallet & John R. Schroeter, The Effects of the Business Cycle on 
LESLIE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2017  10:57 AM 
2017] PRICE-FIXING CONSPIRACIES 603 
greater commitments to their coconspirators than to their customers or 
competition law. Archer Daniels Midland (ADM)—which led 
international cartels in several commodities, including lysine and citric 
acid—memorialized this attitude in its internal corporate slogan: “The 
competitors are our friends, and the customers are our enemies.”236 A 
multinational corporation that fixes prices in one national market is 
more likely to engage in price fixing in another national market.237 The 
tobacco cartel in the Williamson case proves this point. The plaintiff 
alleged that the defendants were already fixing prices in ten other 
national markets, none of which are geographically connected. The 
Hungarian tobacco market and the Costa Rican tobacco market, for 
example, are not connected under the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning 
even though they were, in fact, all cogs in the same international 
tobacco cartel machine. 
It is perplexing that some courts suggest that there is no 
connection between foreign and domestic price fixing when the same 
multinational corporations that are fixing prices in non-U.S. markets 
are also engaging in suspicious parallel pricing behavior in the U.S. 
market. These courts overly focus on individuals when the connection 
is corporate. The fact that the individuals in the U.S. subsidiary are not 
actively discussing price fixing with their foreign counterparts in a non-
U.S. subsidiary (that is engaging in price fixing) does not mean that 
there is no connection.238 In this scenario, the proven foreign cartel and 
the alleged domestic cartel are by definition connected because the 
same multinational corporations are involved. 
Empirically, foreign price-fixing activity is connected to price 
fixing by the same corporate defendants in the United States. This is 
the nature of international cartels. Price-fixing conspiracies often start 
abroad and, once perfected, wind their way to the U.S. market. For 
example, the price-fixing conspiracy in electrical and mechanical 
carbon products began in the United Kingdom and expanded to the 
United States.239 The multibillion dollar international cartel in vitamins 
 
Oligopoly Coordination: Evidence from the U.S. Rayon Industry, 10 REV. INDUS. ORG. 181, 189 
(1995).  
 236. EICHENWALD, supra note 151, at 51.  
 237. See, e.g., CONNOR, supra note 116, at 225. 
 238. Chief executives of foreign corporations often play a role in directing their U.S. 
subsidiaries to engage in price fixing with competitors. See, e.g., United States v. Norris, 753 F. 
Supp. 2d 492, 515 (E.D. Pa. 2010), aff’d, 419 F. App’x 190 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 239. United States v. Norris, 419 F. App’x 190, 191 (3d Cir. 2011) (affirming conviction of 
Chief Executive Officer, Ian Norris, pursuant to “indictment [that] alleged that Norris met with 
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began with meetings between officials from two European vitamin 
manufacturers about a limited range of products and expanded into 
dozens of vitamin products and regions, including the United States.240 
Courts suggesting that defendants’ foreign price fixing is probably 
unconnected to lockstep parallel price increases in the American 
market ignore a century of historical research showing how 
international cartels function. 
 b. Overlooked Connections.  American courts have gone out 
of their way to obfuscate the inherent connection between foreign and 
domestic price fixing when the same corporate owners are involved. 
Judges have discounted corporate affiliation and ignored the 
importance of corporate culture. More importantly, they discount the 
connections right in front of them. The chocolate cartel is a good case 
in point. In In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust, the Third Circuit 
held that there was no “necessary link” shown between the proven 
Canadian conspiracy and the alleged American conspiracy despite the 
plaintiffs’ evidence that Bob Leonidas, CEO of Nestlé Canada, “played 
a key role in the Canadian conspiracy and regularly interacted with 
U.S. executives, including with Nestlé USA’s team when Nestlé 
considered buying Hershey.”241 The court reasoned that Leonidas “did 
not have pricing authority for the U.S. market” and that his 
“documented communications with U.S. executives” did not show 
“illegal conduct in Canada.”242 
The court’s approach sets an almost impossible standard for 
plaintiffs to show a connection between interrelated foreign and 
American price-fixing conspiracies. First, contrary to the Third 
Circuit’s approach, the actual pricing authority of individuals is 
irrelevant because a foreign executive engaged in price fixing can show 
his or her American counterpart in the same corporation how to start 
and operate a cartel in the United States. If the corporation’s head 
 
various competitors in a price-fixing scheme that eventually expanded into the United States 
market”); see also United States v. Norris, 719 F. Supp. 2d 557, 560 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (giving more 
background). 
 240. Sam Foster Halabi, Note, The “Comity” of Empagran: The Supreme Court Decides That 
Foreign Competition Regulation Limits American Antitrust Jurisdiction over International Cartels, 
46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 279, 281 (2005) (“Beginning in January 1988, officials from two European 
vitamin manufacturers—F. Hoffmann-La Roche and BASF—embarked on a price-fixing 
enterprise for bulk vitamins that expanded to involve every major world vitamin producer and 
affected every major world market.”). 
 241. In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 406 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 242. Id.  
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office tolerates or endorses the non-American subsidiary’s price fixing, 
it is more likely to encourage and enable price fixing by its American 
subsidiary as well. Moreover, no CEO of a foreign subsidiary would 
ever have true pricing authority over the CEO of the same company’s 
American subsidiary. If the Third Circuit’s opinion were mistakenly 
interpreted as requiring proof that one or more specific individuals had 
pricing authority in two separate countries, then there could almost 
never be a sufficient link between sister subsidiaries that were actually 
operating an international cartel. 
Second, the evidence regarding Leonidas shows a potential 
connection between the two cartels. Under a plausible reading of the 
plaintiffs’ allegations, Leonidas served as a mentor to the American 
cartel. He had every incentive to do so because price disparities 
between the Canadian and American markets could expose the 
Canadian conspiracy.243 Pricing authority is irrelevant in his role as 
cartel tutor. By way of comparison, in the international lysine cartel, 
Terry Wilson of ADM attended cartel meetings and played a key role 
even though he had no pricing authority over lysine and indeed seemed 
to know little about the product. Wilson’s value to the lysine cartel was 
his experience in running the international citric acid cartel. The 
Seventh Circuit held that evidence of the citric acid cartel was relevant 
and admissible in the government’s prosecution of Wilson and other 
ADM participants in the lysine cartel because it explained Wilson’s 
role in connecting the two—seemingly unrelated—conspiracies.244 
Third, the fact that Leonidas’s communications did not document 
illegal price fixing in Canada seems irrelevant given that we know that 
the Canadian chocolate manufacturers fixed price. In addition to the 
evidence of the price-fixing CEO of Nestlé Canada being involved in 
the American market, the plaintiffs also presented emails from 
Hershey Canada executives to Hershey’s American executives that 
revealed that price discussions had occurred among the rival Canadian 
chocolate manufacturers.245 The Third Circuit dismissed these as 
showing, at most, that “some Hershey executives in the United States 
were aware of the Canadian conspiracy” but not whether Mars and 
Nestlé USA knew.246 The connection between conspiracies was 
 
 243. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 244. United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 666 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Wilson’s entire reason for 
getting involved in lysine was to share his criminal experience.”). 
 245. In re Chocolate Confectionary, 801 F.3d at 406. 
 246. Id. at 406–07. 
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stronger than the court admitted given that the court also noted that 
the Hershey parent company “approves all domestic and international 
pricing decisions.”247 Yet even after Hershey Canada pled guilty to 
price fixing in 2007 and paid a fine of $4 million (in Canadian dollars),248 
the court rejected any probative value, suggesting that the pricing 
decisions of Hershey’s Canada and Hershey’s USA were unconnected, 
despite the fact that they are subdivisions of the same company that 
controls the pricing of both entities. The Third Circuit minimized or 
disregarded all of the connections and then rejected the plaintiffs’ 
claims for lack of connection.249 
Similarly, the court in In re Elevators asserted that the defendants’ 
foreign price fixing provided “no basis from which to infer” similar 
activity in the U.S. market because there was no connection between 
the proven European cartel and the alleged American one.250 Yet the 
 
 247. In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 999 F. Supp. 2d 777, 782 (M.D. Pa. 2014). 
 248. In re Chocolate Confectionary, 801 F.3d at 393. 
 249. The Third Circuit also invoked Areeda and Hovenkamp’s influential antitrust treatise 
for the proposition that “[i]llegal behavior elsewhere in time or place does not generally allow the 
inference of an immediate conspiracy.” Id. at 402 (quoting AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 
213, at 146).  
The court is, however, misinterpreting the treatise. The Antitrust Law treatise argues that 
the existence of foreign price-fixing does not prove additional price-fixing in other markets. This 
is true, but that does not mean that foreign price-fixing is not relevant. After all, rarely will a 
single plus factor, in and of itself, be proof of agreement. Moreover, Professors Areeda and 
Hovenkamp also note:  
Economic performance in comparable markets might also be probative: proof of 
conspiracy elsewhere may suggest that similar prices or actions here are also 
attributable to a conspiracy; or proof of competition elsewhere may suggest that less 
competitive performance here results from a conspiracy. Finally, the agreement 
elsewhere may be ancillary to the agreement locally.  
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 213, at 145. While the authors acknowledge the potential 
difficulty of establishing the comparability of markets, id. at 145–46, they also advocate shifting 
the burden to price-fixing defendants who have engaged in price-fixing in “adjacent geographic 
markets.” Id. at 146. Specifically, such price-fixing defendants should bear 
the burden of going forward with evidence of an explanation that performance is 
different in the second market, that any motivation for conspiracy in one market does 
not extend to the other, or that the personnel or other circumstances make it 
unreasonable to interpret the proved conspiracy as extending to the adjacent market. 
Id. Under this approach, the burden should be on the defendant chocolatiers to explain why they 
conspired in Canada but not in the adjacent American market. Cf. id. at 151 (noting that “[c]lose 
geographical proximity is probably sufficient to support a conspiracy finding in the absence of 
probative rebuttal evidence” since defendants who consciously enter a conspiracy “are in the best 
position to explain why they chose to enter a conspiracy in one place and not next door”). 
Although the treatise is discussing neighboring states, not countries, the rational for burden 
shifting is similar. 
 250. In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., No. 04 CV 1178, 2006 WL 1470994, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 
30, 2006), aff’d, 502 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the same corporate defendants were 
involved in both geographic markets, that the elevators sold in the 
American market were manufactured and exported to the United 
States by the known European price fixers, and that “invoicing to 
customers in the United States and Europe [was] handled through the 
same inter-company accounting system.”251 The complaint further 
explained that because the market for elevator sales and service is 
global, the prices in the European and American markets affect each 
other.252 The court denied that these allegations represented a 
sufficient connection, reasoning that the complaint “lacks the 
anomalous behavior, which the court in Twombly found to be a strong 
indicia of conspiracy.”253 But the court failed to realize that the 
defendants’ proven illegal collusion in Europe is the “anomalous 
behavior” that makes the same parallel pricing in the American market 
more likely to be the product of collusion. Ultimately, the court did not 
recognize that the link between the two conspiracies—the one alleged 
in the United States and the one admitted to in Europe—is that they 
involve the same corporate defendants, engaging in the same illegal 
conduct involving the same product billed through “the same inter-
company accounting system.”254 That’s a connection.255 
3. Confusing Plus Factors with Direct Proof.  In declining to treat 
the defendants’ foreign price fixing as a plus factor, some courts seem 
to misapprehend how plus-factor analysis works. The combination of 
conscious parallelism and plus factors allows antitrust plaintiffs to 
present a circumstantial case from which a jury can reasonably infer an 
agreement among the defendants. If plaintiffs have direct evidence of 
an agreement, they do not need to use this circumstantial approach. 
Despite the fact that that the circumstantial plus-factor test is 
intended for those antitrust plaintiffs who do not have direct evidence 
of an agreement, some courts have essentially held that the defendants’ 
foreign price-fixing activity cannot be a plus factor unless the plaintiff 
presents some direct evidence of an agreement. For example, the 
 
 251. Id. at *7. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at *10. 
 254. Id. at *7. 
 255. Similarly, in the tobacco cartel, if the decisionmakers of the major tobacco companies 
are meeting to fix prices in Argentina, Canada, Costa Rica, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, 
Hungary, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, how likely is it that they never mention the U.S. market 
but nonetheless have lockstep price increases over several years? 
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Kansas appellate court rejected foreign price-fixing behavior as a plus 
factor by quoting the Eleventh Circuit’s Williamson opinion for the 
proposition that “the opportunity to fix prices without any showing 
that [the defendant tobacco companies] actually conspired does not 
tend to exclude the possibility that they did not avail themselves of such 
opportunity or, conversely, that they actually did conspire.”256 This 
confuses plus factors with direct proof. If the plaintiffs have to show 
that the defendants “actually conspired,” that constitutes a direct-
evidence requirement, which is completely inconsistent with the 
circumstantial approach of plus-factor analysis. 
Similarly, the district court in the chocolate cartel case rejected the 
notion that communications related to the proven Canadian cartel and 
the alleged American cartel could be a plus factor because 
“‘[c]ommunications between competitors do not permit an inference 
of an agreement to fix prices unless those communications rise to the 
level of an agreement, tacit or otherwise.’”257 On appeal, the Third 
Circuit in In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust faulted the plaintiffs’ 
evidence of communications between Nestlé’s Canadian and 
American subsidiaries for failing to show illegal conduct.258 
Intercompetitor communications are a plus factor for proving an 
agreement among defendants through circumstantial evidence. If the 
plaintiffs must prove that these communications definitely included an 
illegal agreement, the court is essentially requiring direct evidence of a 
price-fixing agreement. 
These opinions seem to suggest that because foreign price fixing is 
not dispositive proof of domestic price fixing that it is not a plus factor. 
But this line of thinking misapprehends plus factors and how they 
operate in antitrust law. Plus factors are for proving an agreement 
through indirect evidence. To hold that something cannot constitute a 
plus factor unless it constitutes direct evidence destroys the entire 
framework for proving an agreement through circumstantial evidence. 
The presence of a non-U.S. price-fixing conspiracy is a plus factor. It is 
not itself proof, and it is not direct evidence of an antitrust violation in 
the United States. Requiring some connection between the foreign 
cartel and the alleged American cartel is reasonable, but when that 
 
 256. Smith v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 335 P.3d 644, 669 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting 
Williamson Oil Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1319 (11th Cir. 2013)). 
 257. In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 999 F. Supp. 2d 777, 800 (M.D. Pa. 2014) 
(quoting In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 126 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
 258. In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 405–06 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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requirement of a connection rises to the level of direct evidence of 
price fixing in the American market, courts are effectively dismantling 
the plus-factor framework. After all, the entire purpose of the plus 
factor process is to demonstrate the presence of an agreement in the 
absence of direct evidence. 
4. The Discovery and Admissibility of Evidence of Defendants’ 
Foreign Price Fixing. The failure of courts to appreciate the 
significance of foreign price-fixing activity affects many aspects of 
antitrust litigation. In addition to discounting the import of foreign 
conspiracies as a matter of substantive antitrust law, courts also 
sometimes commit procedural errors. For example, some courts have 
prevented plaintiffs from discovering evidence that defendants have 
fixed prices in foreign markets.259 It seems problematic for the court 
simultaneously to deny the plaintiffs any discovery into the defendants’ 
foreign price-fixing activity and to condemn the plaintiffs for not 
linking that foreign activity with the alleged domestic cartel. For 
example, the Third Circuit in In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust 
condemned the plaintiffs for not showing that the same people were 
involved in the alleged foreign and domestic cartels.260 Yet it is 
practically impossible for plaintiffs to show common personnel 
between the foreign and domestic cartels when the plaintiffs are denied 
meaningful discovery into the operations of the foreign cartel. 
Plaintiffs are entitled to discovery of the defendants’ foreign price-
fixing activities because, in the context of international cartels, the 
foreign conduct is relevant to the alleged domestic conduct.261 When 
the alleged conspiracy is global, evidence of activities in foreign 
markets “would be relevant to show the breadth of the conspiracy, the 
role that each defendants’ executives played in implementing, 
expanding, enforcing and concealing the conspiracy, and how the 
conspiracy was maintained for the length of time alleged.”262 Plaintiffs 
need discovery to show the connection between the foreign and 
domestic price-fixing activities. 
In general, discovery in antitrust litigation is not confined to the 
 
 259. Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1312 (N.D. 
Ga. 2002) (“Accordingly, the court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to conduct foreign discovery.”). 
 260. In re Chocolate Confectionary, 801 F.3d at 403. 
 261. See In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., No. 1426, 2004 WL 7200711 at *3–4 
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2004), aff’d sub nom., Williamson Oil Co., 346 F.3d 1287. 
 262. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., No. 99-197TFH, 2001 WL 1049433, at *11 (D.D.C. June 
20, 2001). 
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defendants’ activities in the geographic market at issue in the case.263 
Even if the plaintiffs were not trying to use the defendant’s foreign 
price fixing as a plus factor, liberal discovery of price-fixing defendants’ 
“purely foreign activities” makes sense for several reasons. Evidence 
related to foreign transactions “could also lead to the discovery of 
other admissible information by allowing plaintiffs to discover ‘the 
identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable 
matter,’ which is explicitly authorized by Revised Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(b)(1).”264 Discovery related to price-fixing defendants’ behavior in 
foreign markets may likely lead to admissible evidence showing the 
defendants’ motives and opportunities for fixing price in the United 
States, as well as evidence relating to such potentially important issues 
as “the manner by which defendants fraudulently concealed the 
conspiracy from plaintiffs.”265 Evidence of defendants’ foreign conduct 
may help explain how a price-fixing cartel operated in the United 
States. For example, in In re Aspartame Antitrust Litigation, the district 
court explained that 
information and documents that relate, to among other things, the 
non-U.S. manufacture, sale and distribution of aspartame may prove 
relevant to establishing the existence of a global conspiracy to allocate 
the market for aspartame, the ability of market participants to engage 
in domestic price fixing and the mechanisms employed by market 
participants in price fixing.266 
Including discovery of price-fixing activity outside the geographic 
market at issue is customary. It should remain so when the plaintiff is 
seeking to use evidence of the defendants’ foreign price fixing as a plus 
 
 263. See e.g., Kellam Energy, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F. Supp. 215, 219 (D. Del.1985) 
(“[R]egardless of how [the] geographic market is eventually defined in [an antitrust] action, the 
boundaries of that market do not set the geographic limits of discovery. . . .”). 
 264. In re Vitamins, 2001 WL 1049433, at *11; see also In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 261 
F.R.D. 570, 574 (D. Kan. 2009); Kellam Energy, Inc., 616 F. Supp. at 219 (“Where allegations of 
conspiracy to restrain trade and intent to monopolize are at issue, as in the instant case, a broad 
scope for discovery is appropriate, because the conspiracy may involve actors outside of the 
plaintiff’s geographic market and the scheme of monopolization may involve an area larger than 
the plaintiff’s own limited sphere of operations.”).  
 265. In re Plastics Additives Antitrust Litig., No. CIV.A. 03-2038, 2004 WL 2743591, at *14 
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2004) (“[D]ocuments produced to foreign investigative bodies are relevant” 
because “these documents may lead to evidence that illuminates defendants’ motive and 
opportunity for the alleged conspiracy within the United States, the breadth of the conspiracy, 
and the manner by which defendants fraudulently concealed the conspiracy from plaintiffs.”). 
 266. In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., No. 2:06-CV-1732-LDD, 2008 WL 2275531, at *2 (E.D. 
Pa. May 13, 2008). 
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factor. 
Finally, the illegality of foreign price fixing should not be a 
prerequisite for discovery. In Williamson, the Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s denial of discovery into the defendants’ 
foreign price-fixing activities unless the plaintiffs could first prove their 
illegality under foreign law. The court’s approach is flawed because 
foreign price fixing is a plus factor regardless of its illegality.267 
Moreover, as the district court in In re Automotive Refinishing Paint 
Antitrust Litigation268 explained when explicitly disagreeing 
with Williamson, evidence of illegality cannot be a prerequisite to the 
discovery of anticompetitive conduct in foreign countries because 
“[t]he Sherman Act encompasses conduct occurring outside our 
borders when that conduct has an effect on American commerce, even 
if the activities are not illegal in the countries where they are 
committed.”269 Antitrust discovery has never been limited to 
anticompetitive conduct already proven to be illegal. Courts should not 
restrict discovery in this manner when plaintiffs seek evidence of the 
defendants’ price fixing in foreign markets. 
Finally, to the extent that courts are worried about unfairly 
burdening defendants with excessively expansive discovery requests, 
that does not warrant a complete ban on discovery of foreign price 
fixing. Courts can manage and monitor these discovery requests as they 
do with other discovery disputes. At a minimum, it makes particular 
sense to require domestic defendants to produce documents that they 
have already submitted to foreign competition authorities that are 
investigating—or have investigated—the defendants’ pricing behavior, 
because such requests are not unreasonably burdensome.270 
Judicial errors about evidence of defendants’ foreign price fixing 
are not limited to discovery disputes. Courts have also mishandled 
evidentiary rulings. In the federal tobacco conspiracy case, the district 
court held that any evidence of the defendants’ participation in price 
fixing in other countries was inadmissible because Federal Rule of 
Evidence “Rule 404(b) allows jury inferences only where the compared 
conduct is closely analogous to the conduct at issue in the instant 
 
 267. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 268. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., No. 1426, 2004 WL 7200711 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 
29, 2004). 
 269. Id. at *4. 
 270. In re Plastics Additives Antitrust Litig., No. CIV.A. 03-2038, 2004 WL 2743591, at *13 
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2004) (discussing the recent order from In re Auto. Refinishing Paint). 
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suit.”271 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling 
because the plaintiffs’ evidence did not “readily establish a prior crime, 
wrong or act where appellants ultimately have failed to establish that 
the foreign conduct was a crime or wrong under the laws of the foreign 
sovereigns.”272 Both courts seemed to think that foreign price fixing is 
not “closely analogous” unless it is also illegal. That is wrong. The 
defendants’ foreign conduct is “closely analogous” because it is price 
fixing, not because it is unlawful. 
Evidence that the defendants have engaged in price fixing in 
foreign markets is admissible because it is probative of whether these 
same defendants have fixed prices in the American marketplace. 
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of the defendant’s 
prior misdeeds is admissible to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of 
accident.”273 This is precisely the role that evidence of foreign price 
fixing is playing in antitrust litigation. Courts have explained that 
“evidence concerning a prior conspiracy may be relevant and 
admissible to show the background and development of a current 
conspiracy.”274 Evidence of the defendant’s participation in a separate 
price-fixing conspiracy is admissible to show how that separate 
conspiracy “provided the blueprint for and motivating force behind” 
the price-fixing conspiracy being alleged in the case at hand.275 
Similarly, evidence of foreign price fixing should be admissible because 
it helps establish the plus factors of opportunity and ability to fix prices 
in the American domestic market.276 Indeed, the evidence is admissible 
because foreign price fixing is a plus factor and also satisfies many 
individual plus factors.277 
 
 271. Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1313 (N.D. 
Ga. 2002) (“Thus, Plaintiffs cannot show that ‘conspiracies in foreign markets’ is a ‘plus factor.’”), 
aff’d sub nom., Williamson Oil Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 272. Williamson Oil Co., 346 F.3d at 1317. 
 273. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 274. In re Flash Memory Antitrust Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1149 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 
(discussing United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
 275. Andreas, 216 F.3d at 665 (“The citric-acid conspiracy, of which [the defendant] was 
aware, provided the blueprint for and motivating force behind the nascent lysine scheme. Many 
of the lysine cartel’s meetings revolved around the need to allocate sales volume, a lesson dictated 
by the experience in the citric-acid conspiracy.”). 
 276. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 1426, 2004 WL 7200711, at *3 
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2004) (“Evidence of foreign price-fixing among Defendants would also be 
material to prove that they had the opportunity and ability to engage in domestic price-fixing for 
automotive refinishing paint.”). 
 277. See supra Part IV.A. 
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The arguments for admissibility are even stronger in the context 
of international cartels. Evidence of price fixing in other markets is 
particularly probative if the plaintiff’s theory of the case entails a 
geographically broad conspiracy that includes and extends beyond the 
American marketplace.278 When the domestic price-fixing conspiracy 
is part of a geographically larger price-fixing conspiracy, Rule 404(b) 
should not exclude evidence of that larger conspiracy.279 
These misguided judicial decisions regarding discovery and 
admissibility flow from courts failing to appreciate that the defendants’ 
foreign price fixing constitutes a plus factor for proving the existence 
of an agreement that violates the Sherman Act. Because the absence 
of direct evidence ordinarily makes the use of plus factors necessary to 
prove an agreement, plaintiffs are entitled to discovery on plus factors 
and to present them to a jury. Courts cannot simultaneously require 
plus factors and deny plaintiffs discovery into relevant plus factors or 
hold that evidence of plus factors is inadmissible.280 If courts better 
appreciated that defendants’ foreign price-fixing activities are plus 
factors, judges would be less likely to err when making discovery and 
evidentiary rulings.281 
 
 278. See Charley’s Tour & Transp., Inc. v. InterIsland Resorts, Ltd., No. 80-0060, 1985 WL 
6268, at *2 (D. Haw. Oct. 10, 1985) (“[E]vidence of conspiracy in other markets and prior to the 
statute of limitations for this action is relevant and admissible as proof of a single overall 
conspiracy . . . .”). 
 279. Andreas, 216 F.3d at 665 (admitting evidence of defendant’s participation in another 
price-fixing conspiracy because “[w]hile not an express exception to Rule 404(b), this type of 
evidence is permitted by virtue of not being included within the province of the rule. ‘Other crimes 
or acts’ does not include those acts that are part and parcel of the charged crime itself; they simply 
are not ‘other.’”). 
 280. Courts have created a series of no-win situations when plaintiffs seek discovery to show 
that the defendants’ foreign price fixing should constitute a plus factor: 
● Plaintiffs cannot have discovery into the defendants’ foreign price-fixing activity 
unless they can prove that that price fixing violated foreign law but plaintiffs cannot 
prove that the defendants’ arrangements violate the rule of reason without discovery. 
● Plaintiffs cannot survive a motion to dismiss—and thus, cannot have discovery into 
the defendants’ foreign price-fixing activity—unless the plaintiffs can prove a specific 
connection between that foreign cartel and the alleged American cartel but plaintiffs 
cannot prove a sufficient connection to satisfy courts without the discovery that courts 
deny them. 
These court-constructed Catch-22s make it harder for valid price-fixing claims to reach a jury. Yet 
most judges do not seem aware of the bind in which they have put antitrust plaintiffs. 
 281. Courts have recognized that “a broad scope of discovery is particularly appropriate in 
antitrust litigation because, for example, relevant business documents pertaining to the antitrust 
conspiracy may not exist and covert behavior may have to be proven through less direct means.” 
In re Microcrystalline Cellulose Antitrust Litig., 221 F.R.D. 428, 429–30 (E.D. Pa. 2004); see also 
Callahan v. A.E.V., Inc., 947 F. Supp. 175, 179 (W.D. Pa. 1996) (“Discovery in an antitrust case is 
necessarily broad because allegations involve improper business conduct. . . . Such conduct is 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
By failing to appreciate the significance of foreign cartels, courts 
have drawn a roadmap for would be price fixers: Start the price-fixing 
conspiracy in a cartel-friendly jurisdiction. This “legal” cartel will help 
the price fixers build trust, which will allow the conspirators to rely on 
trust instead of cartel enforcement mechanisms, the use of which may 
expose the cartel to antitrust authorities. After the price-fixing firms 
have mastered how to run a cartel efficiently in these jurisdictions, they 
can expand their operations to the American market. 
Although the mechanics of cartel operations and the doctrines of 
antitrust law can be complicated, the issues here are not. After antitrust 
plaintiffs have shown that the defendants accused of price fixing have 
engaged in conscious parallel pricing, is it more likely these same firms 
have fixed prices in the United States if they are engaging in—or have 
recently engaged in—price fixing in another jurisdiction? The answer 
is simple: yes. Although the defendants’ foreign price-fixing activity 
does not prove domestic price fixing, it is probative. 
 
generally covert and must be gleaned from records, conduct, and business relationships.”). The 
better reasoned judicial decisions recognize that “[p]ermitting discovery of alleged conspirators’ 
foreign activities in cases asserting antitrust violations in the United States is well supported by 
caselaw.” In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 261 F.R.D. 570, 573–74 (D. Kan. 2009). 
